Chapter 8: The Why Behind More Faulty Changes 080225

     Around this same time, when my squad was regularly leading the Battalion in these night marches, Dick Cavazos had just become our battalion commander, and our division commander, William DePuy, was fired. Arguably, DePuy was the best general in the Third Corps but was not allowed to finish Operation Junction City, an operation he had helped plan. However, he had also butted heads with his superior, Lt. General Seaman, on the specifics of those plans. I mentioned this in an earlier chapter. The paper-pushing Westmoreland, who liked to dress like a warrior, let this happen.         

     When I was first assigned to the First Division, the Division Commander was Major General William DePuy. He was Westmoreland's deputy advisor before becoming our division commander. He would go on to make four stars and become a driving force, initiating monumental changes in our military. In Vietnam, he made at least one change, which was responsible for saving many lives. That contribution was known as the DePuy Bunker. Major General William DePuy from North Dakota was one of the few general officers in Vietnam who at least had some understanding of the devastating ripple effects of poor tactical leadership. As a green Lieutenant, he witnessed firsthand in World War II the disastrous impact of poor battalion-level tactical leadership on the ranks of his 90th Division in Normandy. Within 6 weeks, the unit had sustained 100% casualties of enlisted men and 150% of its officers had become casualties. This huge casualty rate was primarily due to the lack of proper tactical know-how. Now, in Vietnam, the very same thing was happening again, and DePuy recognized the problem, but what could he do about it? Tactical understanding of the type needed in jungle warfare was nonexistent in those days. I am not talking about a strategy to win the war. That was altogether another issue. In America, politicians have the final say on strategy. Here, I am simply talking about tactics to win individual battles without having to endure the wholesale slaughter of one's command.

     DePuy at least had some understanding of workable tactics to protect the lives of his fighting men. His quick mind just naturally moved him in the right direction when it came to the tactical part of the puzzle. Unlike our new commander, Dick Cavazos, and other young leaders who would come after Cavazos, like Lt. General Lawson Magruder and General Petraeus, DePuy was not a good mentor, which is synonymous with being a good communicator. He expected his people to be miraculously perfect straight out of the box. Real life rarely works that way. When it didn't, DePuy would fire that battalion commander, and then he would fire their replacement, too. That was his answer to the problem, which was no answer at all. Army Chief of Staff Johnson recognized this problem in DePuy's leadership skills, but he didn't know what to do about it either. So, he eventually replaced DePuy. Although DePuy was a skilled tactician himself, he lacked the understanding to activate the chain of command so that those skills could be passed down and, just as importantly, be improved upon.  

     Still, a frustrated DePuy was able to implement one lasting tactical idea while in command. It saved many lives. It was called the DePuy Bunker, and he mandated that all night defensive positions should have these. They were to be constructed before the soldier was allowed to sleep. The bunker was built deep enough for a man to stand up in it. It had overhead and frontal protection made with sandbags. There was an opening in the back and two firing ports at a forty-five-degree angle in the front. The ports in front allowed the soldier's firing field to intersect the firing field of the bunker next to him. This configuration provided a wall of interlocking fire to repel enemy attacks. This bunker was a sound component of our defensive tactics. 

     As I have said, DePuy was opposed to Operation Cedar Falls, which was the ill-conceived brainchild of his superior, Lt. General Seaman. It was a lead-in operation to Operation Junction City. It was supposed to clear out strongholds that might threaten our supply lines supporting the larger operation when it kicked off further north. It was simply an unnecessary precaution with too many moving parts. Besides, we already had forces available for the protection of Saigon and our protected supply routes were more than adequate. There was no need to dillydally.

     DePuy wanted to get on with Operation Junction City. He suggested that we quickly encircle the northern portion of War Zone C with blocking forces and then sweep through it from the south with other forces. That would catch the bulk of the Ninth Division between a hammer and an anvil. Intelligence sources had confirmed that the entire COSN leadership was hiding somewhere within that net. COSN leadership was composed of some forty or fifty irreplaceable people. They ran the whole enemy insurgency effort to enslave all of South Vietnam. Wasting time and resources on an operation like Cedar Falls only gave more time for enemy spies in Saigon to learn about the upcoming Junction City Operation, which is precisely what happened. Thus, those COSVN leaders were given precious time to escape the noose.

     Although wars may be fought for the most righteous reasons, we will never be able to execute that war, or any other human endeavor for that matter, in a way that will bring about a completely righteous victory. Satan uses this fact to condemn those involved in not just war, but all righteous causes. Yet, as imperfect as righteous wars may be, they will be necessary to stave off evil until Christ returns. Sometimes, there is no righteous side to war. However, anyone who fights against the evil ideology of communism is always fighting on the righteous side of that war, provided that victory will preserve individual freedom and inalienable rights. It's as simple as that. It's also important to note that just fighting for a righteous cause does not guarantee victory. We need Godly understanding. When righteous causes are executed by unrighteous leadership, Godly understanding is nowhere to be found. When it is lacking, confusion sets in very quickly. However, what exactly is Godly understanding?      

    General Patton once said, "There are three ways that men get what they want: by planning, by working, and by praying. Any great military operation takes careful planning. Then, one must have well-trained troops to carry out those plans. In war, there lurk many potentially disastrous unknowns. How those unexpected events are addressed spells victory or defeat. Some see the results of their efforts as just "the breaks", "Que Sera, Sera". What will be will be. However, every circumstance we face in life is just another opportunity for the believer in Christ to insert Godly understanding into the equation. Godly understanding is simply our ability to tap into that truthful understanding so we can take the next right step in any situation that we face in life. Godly understanding comes to us through meditating on His word and through prayer, but not just any old kind of prayer. As believers in Christ, we must first believe that He is the Author and Finisher of every good work, in every situation that we face in life, and that includes war. We must not only pray that His will be done, but we must also declare before heaven and Hell that His will be done in every situation. 

    It was around the first part of March 1967, shortly after our new commander took command, when things immediately started to change. The 1/18th just seemed to start getting those breaks, which Patton recognized as the result of the hand of God. Though the fighting became much more intense as the year went by, those breaks became increasingly remarkable. Our sister Battalion, the 1/16th, led by Korean veteran, Lt. Col. Rufus Lazzell, on the other hand, seemed never to get a break. Why was this? Most people would say that our good breaks and his bad breaks were just a coincidence. Both units were fighting for the same righteous cause. Both units had courageous unit commanders. Both were attacked in the same ways by the enemy. However, time and time again, we came out smelling like a rose, and the 1/16th got shot to pieces. Could the difference in our outcomes have had something to do with this thing called prayer? K.I.A. reports showed that most of the men in both units had a Christian background. I am sure that the number of men in both units who prayed was about the same. If so, did that mean that the prayers of Christians in my unit were somehow more effective than the prayers of men in the 1/16th? What was going on? 

    Was God working autonomously, whether we prayed or not? Were our outcomes just a matter of luck? God knew better than anyone when he should intervene and when he shouldn't. So, why does evil seem to get its way so many times in life with some and not with others? The answer to this question is not as mysterious as the reader may think. As surprising as it may sound, God cannot just rush in and fix everything for us. Why? Because God not only makes the rules, but He also follows the rules. One of those rules, which He established long ago, is the one where He gave complete authority for what happens here on earth to us humans. We get to do whatever we please, good, bad, or ugly, limited only by what our flesh and blood bodies are capable of doing. (Psalms 115:16) God does not give dominion over this earth to us human beings and then take back that dominion because we misuse his gift. He would be breaking his own rules if he did that. Since God gave us dominion over the earth, He needs our permission to intervene in certain situations. It's important to understand that God is perfect, and He follows His rules perfectly. To be perfectly legal, God has to work through people to get things done here on earth. That's where prayer comes into the picture. As strange as it may sound to some, God waits for our cooperation through our prayers to go to work on a host of problems, including the ability to wage a righteous war. The big issue here is that we Christians do not understand prayer. Many others do not believe in prayer in the first place. Here is the simple truth about how to pray effectively. You see, we cannot lawfully go before a Holy God to make prayer requests until we first confess Jesus Christ as Lord of all. He is our advocate to the Father God (1 John 2:1) and the only way to gain an audience with God. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit has been sent by Christ Jesus to lead us into all truth, including how and what to say to our Father God as we go before Him with our requests. (John 16:13) Unfortunately, what I have just said is foolishness to many. 

    Believe me when I say that we would not want God to handle every situation himself. He was forced to do that in the Old Testament and ultimately destroyed the entire world with a flood. Today, in this church age, there is a better way. God chooses to work through believers in Christ. Until He returns, we believers have been given that authority to run things down here on earth. We can only do that through the guidance of His Holy Spirit and our prayers inspired by the Holy Spirit. The bottom line is this. When a believer's Holy Spirit-inspired prayers reach the ears of God, mighty supernatural forces are set in motion. No human, no army, or no nation can stand against that. No prayer is uttered more perfectly in the context and language needed to reach the ears of God than the heavenly language of unknown tongues.  

    It's evident to me now that no one in senior leadership had the wherewithal to lead us through the quagmire that was Vietnam for the very reasons that I have just explained. There needed to be sweeping changes that only Washington could mandate, not on a spiritual level but simply on a natural level. That was not going to happen, and here's why. The people in charge of our American foreign policies in Washington knew very little about how a democracy works, much less how to bring it to a godless country like Vietnam. Democratic governments are natural political structures but require a spiritual foundation to function. The entire command structure above DePuy was shackled to the whims of unbelievers. President Johnson, brilliant scholars like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and intelligent generals like Westmoreland (Westy graduated first in his class at West Point) were all people who chose to believe in themselves instead of the God of the Bible. These leaders gave little thought as to how they could cooperate with the God of the universe to get things done here on earth. Instead, they spent too much time wallowing in their thoughts on how to deal with weighty matters of state, which are always far beyond anyone's ability to process. No human being knows how to run a country, let alone a democratic country like ours. Quite frankly, it's impossible without God's help, and yet God must wait for us to request that help through the means which I have just described.     

     General DePuy was replaced on February 10, 1967, halfway through what should have been a regular tour of 18 months. Major General Hay replaced him as our division commander. DePuy had gone around his boss, Lt. General Seaman, and suggested to Westmoreland that they not execute Seaman's precursor to Junction City, which was Cedar Falls. Shortly thereafter, DePuy was removed from command. I have gathered from Westmoreland's biography that Westmoreland could, under pressure, succumb to the prevailing winds. He could have prevented the removal of this highly effective subordinate. Still, it would have no doubt cost him some political capital with Washington, so he allowed Depuy to be thrown under the bus. In Westy's highly organized, but godless mind, underlings were supposed to never stray from blind obedience to their superiors. A great leader like DePuy, on the other hand, invited his subordinates to voice their opposing opinions, but they had better be right about those opinions. That's why all leaders need God. He is the only one who can use even the unpolished and broken pieces of our humanity and turn them into part of a beautiful vase which can also hold water.  

    Our sister battalion, the 1/16th, under the command of Rufus Lazzell, seemed to attract attacks by the enemy like cow patties attract flies. Rufus sustained tremendous losses, time and time again, but continued to garner the approval of his superiors. Go figure!. At the beginning of Operation Junction City, he was very quickly placed in the thick of things up north near the Cambodian border. Knowing what I know now, how anyone could think that this guy had the right stuff is complicated, and I am not sure that I have it figured out. I do know this much. Rufus had the approval of DePuy, and the new commander of the First Division placed great importance on the measures DePuy had established. Plus, DePuy's staff was left in place, and they loved DePuy. I believe that they had a lot of influence on General Hay. In June of 1966, long before DePuy had gotten into trouble with the Army Chief of Staff, Harold Johnson, for firing too many people, he fired the commander of the 1/16th Battalion. He gave the job to Lt. Colonel Rufus Lazzell. Lazzell had already been serving in Vietnam when he took it upon himself to personally schedule a meeting with General DePuy to request a position as one of his battalion commanders. No doubt that initiative impressed DePuy, and no doubt Lazzell's drive and determination shone through during that interview because he got the job. Lazzell had the heart of a volunteer and was a Korean veteran. The service record of a combat leader in Korea was the most objective criterion any Division Commander had for selecting his field commanders. Lazzell's record, by all accounts, was stellar.

     Not long afterward, when the Battalion made contact, Rufus was shot in the elbow while running toward the action. He wanted to lead his men in that particular gunfight personally. His bravery on July 9, 1966, earned him a silver star, but his actions also revealed something else. They showed his lack of judgment. Those actions that day should have raised a red flag, but they didn't. You see, personal courage is only one quality required of a good field commander. At the same time, before a commander runs toward the action, they need to have a plan formulated to counter the enemy's ability to engage. How do I know that Lazzell had no such plan? Because he would not have been running forward in the first place if that were the case. Instead, he would have been working his radios to assist his people at the point of contact and trusting them to make decisions in the heat of the moment. One of the most crucial things for him to do at that moment was something that he should have already done. He should have already established a path to provide those commanders up front with all the artillery and air support available, serving it up in conjunction with the proper tactical maneuvering on the ground. In other words, he and his subordinates should have already been in sync with a plan for such a moment. This contact should not have come as a surprise. Yet, Lazzell was treating this encounter like he and his boys had been going for a peaceful stroll in the park and were accosted. No, they were there to make contact with the enemy and needed to have a plan in place when that event happened. One of the last things almost any of us in my unit would have wanted to see was our commander running around up front, while we were in the heat of battle. It would have been very disconcerting. Lazzell's actions that day said that he didn't trust his men unless he was standing in their hip pocket, looking over their shoulder.

     Fortunately for the 1/16th Battalion that day, it was catching up with the tail end of scattered enemy forces retreating from the Battle of Minh Thanh Road, where DePuy, in a brilliant move, had ambushed the ambushers and shot them to pieces. This action took place in July of 1966. The old veterans in my unit were still talking about that battle and bragging on General DePuy when I got there at the end of the year.

     The wound Lazzell received required him to give up his command and go stateside to Walter Reed for some complicated surgeries to rebuild his elbow. In a very rare move, when Rufus returned to Vietnam the following November, he requested and was given back his command of the 1/16th. Returning Lazzell's command to him indicated that General DePuy was still impressed with Lazzell. It seems DePuy had disregarded the fact that it was Lazzell's knee-jerk reactions that got him shot in the first place. Don't get me wrong. I don't believe Lazzell or our commander, Denton, were incapable of becoming effective commanders. They were simply put into situations without first being taught and then mentored in the fundamentals of effective leadership. At this time, the Army had no such training.

     Our commanding generals could have used a few lessons taken from life on the King Ranch. These lessons were about trust and respect for subordinates. They also had to do with a genuine love for others and not just feigned empathy. The older hands trusted the younger ones (who were often their kin) but followed through with a watchful eye toward accountability and corrective training, not punishment. That process became ingrained in the cultural fabric of the ranch. The three Cavazos boys were exposed to this culture while growing up on that ranch. Lauro Junior talked about an old ranch hand who became a great mentor to him and his brother Richard. However, these leadership principles first emerged from the heart of Henrietta. They were then nurtured by her and passed on through the efforts of Robert Kleberg. The business of war is a deadly business, but it is still an endeavor where the same leadership principles that shaped that King Ranch culture need to be applied to assure consistent and lasting success.   

    In Vietnam, general officers themselves had no experience fighting small-unit actions in jungle terrain. I have read Westmoreland's detailed account of his Vietnam Experience, "A Soldier Reports", and this excellent account gives enough information for me to state, unequivocally, that Westmoreland understood next to nothing about successfully engaging the enemy in the jungle. Yet, there were simple tactics for doing that very effectively. The men of the 1/18th Infantry Battalion proved that time and time again. However, when Rufus Lazzell took over the 1/16th, just like his predecessor, he was immediately in over his head, and he stayed that way for his entire tour of duty as commander of the 1/16th Infantry Battalion. While under his command, the 1/16th Infantry Battalion would suffer needless losses simply because he not only didn't know what he didn't know, but he also seemed unable to learn from his past mistakes. Yet, Rufus was almost the perfect example of the type of field commander who appealed to the average general officer. He checked enough of their boxes to allow him to resume his command once more from November 1966 through June 1967.

     On the same day Lazzell was restored to command of the 1/16th, November 28, 1966, I was just getting off a plane to start my tour of duty in Vietnam. If I had arrived two weeks later, I would have been assigned as one of the replacements in the 1/16th. Why? Because Lazzell's lack of understanding in the deadly art of jungle warfare had caused his C company to sustain over 50% casualties.

     It happened when the C Company commander led them into an ambush on December 11, 1966, near Soui Da. They were doing a sweep west of Highway 13 and north of Lai Khe. They approached a small clearing about fifty meters wide and one hundred meters long. The clearing was more or less in the shape of a fish, with its head pointing northwest and its tail pointing southeast. Instead of zigzagging through the jungle and skirting the perimeter of the clearing, which would have disrupted any ambushes, Lazzell's company commander had the entire company follow an ox cart trail. That trail opened up into the northeast side of the clearing. Now, there were very good reasons for not following trails. Yet, American officers at every level of command kept making that mistake repeatedly. So, throughout the war, the enemy continued to exploit our willful ignorance. One reason for not following trails was that following trails made it much easier for the enemy to run ahead and set up an ambush. That is precisely what the Fifty Cong did at Soui Da.

     When Lazzell's C company point men, following the ox cart trail, arrived at the edge of the clearing, the ambushers were already in place. In an often-used ruse, three Cong jumped up in the middle of the grassy clearing and started running for the opposite wood line. Their purpose was to lure the Americans into the clearing. That's precisely what the Americans did. While they were crossing the clearing, three heavy machine guns hidden within the wood line on three sides of the clearing opened up on them. It may have dawned on the company commander beforehand that they were becoming ducks in a shooting gallery if they entered the clearing. However, even if he thought that, he would have more than likely taken the same action anyway, as incredibly stupid as that sounds now. Why? Because he feared Lt. Col. Lazzell more than he feared the enemy. He feared not being able to please him, and Lazzell had done nothing to dispel that fear. Instead, he had done just the opposite. He had used what I call poison communications to propagate such fear in his subordinates. Building a strong feedback loop between him and his subordinate commanders became impossible in this type of poisoned atmosphere. In this atmosphere, the C Company Commander had already been conditioned to do what he thought Lazzell wanted him to do, even if he had not received a direct order to do it. As could be expected, from my research, I found that a strong, healthy feedback loop was practically nonexistent in the 1/16th under Lazzell's command. I can also say that Lazzell's command was not the exception. It was the norm. At the same time, I am sure the information was there to save C Company.

            Later, after serving under our new commander, Dick Cavazos, for a while, we came across many clearings while on patrol. He made sure that we didn’t dare cross any of them. Instead, we picked a landmark on the other side of that clearing and very quietly skirted the perimeter until we reached that landmark. We then picked up our designated azimuth from there. There is no doubt in my mind that Lazzell’s C Company point men knew to do the same, but it wasn't their choice. If only a feedback loop had existed to help critical tactics like I have just described become standard operating procedures throughout the division. Battalion commanders could have been trained in these better jungle tactics before taking command. Unfortunately, our unit was to become the exception instead of the rule. Continuous implementation of more effective jungle warfare tactics was far removed from becoming the norm. Most field commanders were cut from the mold of people like Lazzell. They did not have the foggiest notion of the importance of what I am saying here.

     Almost every single man in C Company was wounded crossing that field. Sixteen gave everything they had and everything they could ever hope for in life. If I had been a grunt assigned to C Company on this day, I would have had no choice but to become one of those "sitting ducks". This crazy tactic was a travesty that could have been prevented by proper two-way communications within Lazzell's chain of command. However, Lazzell should not take all the blame. Those above him should get the lion's share of blame. Our generals didn't have a clue about what was happening on that jungle battlefield. To make matters worse, many times they were only a few hundred feet above the battle below. It simply never dawned on them that they needed to develop new maneuvering tactics in the first place. At the time, most were too persuaded of their invincibility by America's industrial capabilities. They just didn't give much thought to what was going on in our grunt world. Yet, it is always the grunt's proper use of industrial might that wins or loses the day.  

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