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Chapter 8: More Changes
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Around this same time, when my squad was regularly leading the battalion in these night marches, Dick Cavazos had just become our battalion commander and our division commander, William DePuy, was fired. Arguably, DePuy was the best general in Third Corps but was not allowed to finish Operation Junction City although it was an operation which he had helped plan, but he had also butted heads with his superior, Lt. General Seaman, on the specifics of those plans. I mentioned this in an earlier chapter. The paper pushing Westmoreland, who liked to dress like a warrior, let this happen. When I was first assigned to the First Division, the Division
Commander was Major General William DePuy. He was Westmoreland's deputy
advisor before becoming our division commander. He would go on to make four stars
and became a driving force, initiating monumental changes in
our military. In Vietnam he made at least one change which was
responsible for saving many lives. That contribution was known as the
DePuy Bunker. Major General William DePuy from North Dakota was one of
the few general officers in Vietnam who at least had some understanding
of the devastating ripple effects of poor tactical leadership. As a
green Lieutenant, he witnessed firsthand in World War II what poor
battalion level tactical leadership had done to the ranks of his 90th
Division in Normandy. Within 6 weeks that unit had sustained 100%
casualties of enlisted men and 150% of its officers had become
casualties. This was mostly due to the lack of proper tactical know-how.
Now, In Vietnam, the very same thing was happening again and DePuy
recognized the problem, but what could he do about it? Tactical
understanding of the type needed in jungle warfare was nonexistent in
those days. I am not talking about a strategy to win the war. That is a
different animal. Most of the time politicians determine strategy. In
Vietnam that was above our general’s pay grades. Here, I am simply
talking about tactics to win individual battles without having to endure
the whole-sale slaughter of one’s command.
DePuy at least had some understanding of tactics which worked.
His quick mind just naturally moved him in the right direction when it
came to the tactical part of the puzzle. Unlike our new commander, Dick
Cavazos, and other young leaders who would come after Cavazos, like Lt.
General Lawson Magruder, and General Petraeus, DePuy was not a good
mentor, which is synonymous with being a good communicator. He expected
his people to be miraculously perfect straight out of the box. Real life
rarely works that way. When it didn’t, DePuy would fire that battalion
commander and then he would fire their replacement too. That was his
answer to the problem, which was no answer at all. Army Chief of Staff
Johnson recognized this problem in DePuy’s leadership skills, but he
didn’t know what to do about it either. So, he eventually replaced
DePuy. Although DePuy was a skilled tactician himself, he did not have
the understanding to activate the chain of command, so those skills
could be passed down and just as importantly be improved upon.
Still, a frustrated DePuy was able to implement one lasting
tactical idea, while in command of my Division. It saved many lives. It
was called the DePuy Bunker, and he mandated that all night defensive
positions should have these. They were to be constructed before the
soldier was allowed to sleep. The bunker was constructed deep enough for
a man to stand up in it. It had overhead and frontal protection made
with sandbags. There was an opening in the back and two firing ports at
a forty-five-degree angle in the front. The ports in front allowed the
soldier’s firing field to intersect the firing field of the bunker next
to him. This provided a wall of interlocking fire to repel enemy
attacks. This bunker was a sound component of our defensive tactics.
As I have said, DePuy was opposed to Operation Cedar Falls which
was the ill-conceived brainchild of his superior, Lt. General Seaman. It
was a lead in operation to Operation Junction City. It was supposed to
clear out strong holds which might threaten our supply lines supporting
the larger operation when it kicked off further north. It was simply an
unnecessary precaution with too many moving parts to it. We had forces
available for the protection of Saigon and our supply routes. These were
more than adequate. There was no need to dillydally.
DePuy wanted to get on with Operation Junction City. He wanted to
quickly encircle the northern portion of War Zone C with blocking forces
and then sweep through it from the south with other forces catching the
bulk of the ninth Division between a hammer and an anvil. Intelligence
sources had confirmed that the entire COSN leadership was hiding
somewhere within that net. That leadership body was composed of some
forty or fifty irreplaceable people who were running the entire enemy
insurgency effort to enslave all of South Vietnam. Wasting time and
resources on a totally different type of operation like Cedar Falls did
nothing but give more time for enemy spies in Saigon to learn about the
upcoming Junction City Operation which is exactly what happened. Thus,
those COSVN leaders were given precious time to escape the noose.
Although wars may be fought for the most righteous reasons, we
will never be able to execute that war, or any other human endeavor for
that matter, in a way which will bring about a completely righteous
victory. Satan uses this fact to condemn those involved in not just war,
but all righteous causes. Yet, as imperfect as righteous wars may be,
they will be necessary to stave off evil, until Christ returns.
Sometimes there is no righteous side to war. However, anyone who fights
against the evil ideology of communism is always fighting on the
righteous side of that war, provided that victory will preserve
individual freedom and inalienable rights. It’s as simple as that. It’s
also important to note that just fighting for a righteous cause does not
guarantee victory. We need Godly understanding. When righteous causes
are executed by unrighteous leadership, Godly understanding is nowhere
to be found. When it is lacking, confusion sets in very quickly.
However, what exactly is Godly understanding?
General Patton once said, "There are three ways that men get what
they want; by planning, by working, and by praying. Any great military
operation takes careful planning. Then, one must have well-trained
troops to do the work to carry out those plans. In war there lurks many
potentially disastrous unknowns. How those unexpected events are
addressed spells victory or defeat. Some see the results of their
efforts as just “the breaks”, “Que Sera, Sera”. What will be will be.
However, every circumstance we face in life is just another opportunity
for the believer in Christ to insert Godly understanding into the
equation. Godly understanding is simply our ability to tap into that
truthful understanding so we can take the next right step in any
situation which we face in life. Godly understanding comes to us through
meditating on His word and through prayer, but not just any old kind of
prayer. As believers, in Christ, we must first believe that He is The
Author and Finisher of every good work, in every situation which we face
in life, and that includes war. We must not only pray that His will be
done, but we must also declare before heaven and hell that His will be
done in every situation.
It was around the first part of March, 1967, shortly after our
new commander took command, when things immediately started to change.
The 1/18th just seemed to start getting those breaks which Patton
recognized as the result of the hand of God. Though the fighting became
much more intense as the year went by, those breaks became more and more
remarkable. Our sister Battalion, the
1/16th, led by Korean veteran,
Lt. Col. Rufus Lazzell, on the other hand, seemed to never get a break. Why was
this? Most people would say that our good breaks and his bad breaks were
just coincidence. Both units were fighting for the same righteous cause.
Both units had very brave and smart unit commanders. Both were attacked
in the same ways by the enemy. However, time and time again we came out
smelling like a rose and the 1/16th got shot to pieces. Could the
difference in our outcomes have had something to do with this thing
called prayer? K.I.A. reports showed that most of the men in both units
had a Christian background. I am sure that the number of men in both
units, who prayed, was about the same. If so, did that mean that the
prayers of Christians in my unit were somehow more effective than the
prayers of men in the 1/16th? What was going on?
Was God working autonomously, whether we prayed or not? Were our
outcomes just a matter of luck? Obviously, God knew better than anyone
when he should intervene and when he shouldn’t. He knows better than
anyone what the right course of action is for any given circumstance.
So, why does evil seem to get it’s way so many times in life? The answer
to this question is not as mysterious as the reader may think. As
surprising as it may sound, God cannot just rush in and fix everything
for us. Why? Because, God not only makes the rules, but He also follows
the rules. One of those rules, which He established long ago, is the one
where He gave complete authority for what happens here on earth to us
humans. We get to do whatever we please, good, bad, or ugly, limited
only by what our flesh and blood bodies are capable of doing. (Psalms
115:16) God does not give dominion over this earth to us human beings
and then take back that dominion because we misuse his gift. He would be
breaking his own rules, if He did that. Since God gave dominion of the
earth to us, He needs our permission to take back certain control of
situations. It’s important to understand that God is perfect, and He
follows His rules perfectly. To be perfectly legal, God has to work
through people to get things done here on earth. That's where prayer
comes into the picture. As strange as it may sound to some, God waits
for our cooperation through our prayers to go to work on a host of
problems including the ability to wage a righteous war. The big problem
here of course, is that we Christians do not understand prayer. Many
others do not believe in prayer in the first place. Here is the simple
truth concerning the way to pray effectively. You see, we cannot
lawfully go before a Holy God to make prayer requests until we first
confess Jesus Christ as Lord of all. He is our advocate to the Father
God (1 John 2:1) and the only way to gain an audience with Him.
Furthermore, The Holy Spirit has been sent by Christ Jesus to lead us
into all truth including how and what to say to our Father God as we go
before Him with our requests. (John 16:13) What I have just said is
foolishness to many.
Here is another thought about why God cannot just work
autonomously. Believe me when I say, that we would not want God to do
everything, himself. He was forced to do that in the Old Testament and
wound up destroying the entire world with a flood. Today, in this church
age, there is a better way. God chooses to work through Christ as head
of all. He can be head of all because he is both man and God. Yet, until
He returns, we believers have been given that authority to run things
down here on earth. He gives us the authority to get things done but we
can only do that effectively through our Holy Spirit inspired prayers.
The bottom line is this. When a believer's Holy Spirit inspired prayers
reach the ears of God, His mighty supernatural forces are set in motion.
No human, no army, or no nation can stand against that. No prayer is
uttered more perfectly in the context and language needing to reach the
ears of God, allowing Him permission to act in accordance with His will,
than the heavenly language of unknown tongues.
It’s obvious to me now, that no one in senior leadership had the
wherewithal to lead us through the quagmire that was Vietnam. There
needed to be sweeping changes which only Washington could mandate and
that was not going to happen. Here’s why. The people in charge of our
American foreign policies in Washington knew very little about how
democracy works in their own nation, much less how to bring it to a
godless country like Vietnam. The entire command structure above DePuy
was shackled to the whims of skillful politicians like President Johnson
and brilliant scholars like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and
also very intelligent generals like Westmoreland (Westy graduated first
in his class at West Point) Yet, these leaders gave little thought to
how they could cooperate with The God of the universe, to get things
done here on earth. They spent too much time wallowing in their own
personal thoughts, on how to deal with matters which are, quite frankly,
far beyond anyone’s ability to process. No human being knows how to run
a country much less a democratic country, like ours. Quite frankly, it’s
impossible without God’s help and yet God must wait for us to request
that help through the means which I have just described.
General DePuy was replaced on the 10th of February 1967 halfway
through what should have been a normal tour of 18 months. He was
replaced by Major General Hay, as our division commander. DePuy had went
around his boss, Lt. General Seaman and suggested to Westmoreland that
they not execute Seaman's precursor to Junction City which was Cedar
Falls. Shortly thereafter, DePuy was removed from command. I have
gathered from Westmoreland's own biography, that Westmoreland could,
under pressure, succumb to the prevailing winds. He could have prevented
the removal of this highly effective subordinate, but it would have no
doubt cost him some political capital with Washington, so he allowed
Depuy to be thrown under the bus. In Westy's highly organized, but
godless mind, underlings were supposed to never stray from blind
obedience to their superiors. A great leader like DePuy, on the other
hand, invited his subordinates to voice their opposing opinions, but
they had better be right about those opinions. That’s why all leaders
need God. He is the only one who can use even the unpolished and broken
pieces of our humanity and turn them into part of a beautiful vase which
can also hold water. Our sister battalion, the
1/16th, under the command of Rufus Lazzell, was a battalion, which
seemed to attract attacks by the enemy like poo poo attracts flies.
Rufus sustained tremendous losses time and time again but seemed to
continue to garner the approval of his superiors. Go figure!. At the
beginning of Operation Junction City, he was very quickly placed in the
thick of things up north near the Cambodian border. Knowing what I know
now, how anyone could think that this guy had the right stuff is
definitely complicated and I am not sure that I have it figured out. I
do know this much. Rufus had the approval of DePuy and the new commander
of the First Division put a lot of stock in what DePuy had set in place.
Plus, DePuy's staff was left in place and they loved DePuy. I believe
that they had a lot of influence on General Hay. In June of 1966, long before
DePuy had got into trouble with the Army Chief of Staff, Harold Johnson,
for firing too many people, he fired the commander of the 1/16th
Battalion and gave the job to Lt. Colonel Rufus Lazzell. Lazzell had
already been serving in Vietnam when he took it upon himself to
personally schedule a meeting with General DePuy to request a position
as one of his battalion commanders. No doubt that initiative impressed
DePuy and no doubt Lazzell's personal drive and determination shined
through during that interview because he got the job. Lazzell had the
heart of a volunteer and was a Korean veteran. The service record of a
combat leader in Korea was the most objective criteria any Division
Commander had, for selecting his field commanders. Lazzell's record, by
all accounts, was stellar.
Not long afterward, when the battalion made contact, Rufus was
shot in the elbow, while running toward the action. He wanted to
personally lead his men in that particular gun fight. His bravery that
9th day of July, 1966 earned him a silver star, but his personal actions
also revealed something else. They revealed his lack of judgment. His
actions that day should have raised a red flag, but it didn't. You see,
personal courage is only one quality required of a good field commander.
While running toward the action that commander also needs to have a plan
formulated to destroy the enemy’s ability to engage. How do I know that
Lazzell had no such plan? Because he would not have been running forward
in the first place if that were the case. Instead, he would have been
working his radios to assist his people at the point of contact and
trusting them to make decisions in the heat of the moment. One of the
most crucial things for him to do at that moment was something that he
should have already done. He should have already established a path to
provide those commanders up front with all the artillery and air support
available, serving it up in conjunction with the right tactical
maneuvering on the ground. In
other words, he and his subordinates should have already been in sync
with a plan for such a moment. It wasn’t like they had just been going
for a stroll in the park and got accosted. They were there to make
contact with the enemy. Not always, but most of the time one of the last
things almost any veteran in our unit would have wanted to see was our
commander running around up front, while we were in the heat of battle.
It would have been very disconcerting. What Lazzell’s actions really
said that day was that he didn’t trust his men unless he was there
looking over their shoulder.
Fortunately for the 1/16th battalion that day, it was catching up
with the tail end of scattered enemy forces retreating from the Battle
of Minh Thanh Road, where DePuy, in a brilliant move, had ambushed the
ambushers and shot them to pieces. This action took place in July of
1966. The old veterans in my unit were still talking about that battle
and bragging on General DePuy when I got there at the end of the year.
The wound Lazzell received required him to give up his command
and go stateside to Walter Reed for some complicated surgeries to
rebuild his elbow. In a very rare move, when Rufus returned to Vietnam
the following November, he requested and was given back his command of
the 1/16th. This said that General DePuy was still definitely impressed
with Lazzell. However, having personal drive without the wisdom to go
along with it can be more dangerous than doing nothing at all. Seems
DePuy had turned a blind eye to that fact which had been displayed by
Lazzell’s knee jerk reactions which got him shot in the first place.
Don't get me wrong. I don’t believe Lazzell, or our commander Denton
were incapable of becoming effective commanders. They were simply put
into situations without first being taught and then mentored in the
fundamentals of effective leadership. At this time the Army had no such
training.
Our commanding generals could have used a few lessons taken from
life on the King Ranch. These lessons had to do with trust and respect
for subordinates. They also had to do with a genuine love for others and
not just feigned empathy. The older hands trusted the younger ones (Who
many times were their own kin) but followed through with a watchful eye
toward accountability and corrective training, not punishment. That
process became ingrained in the cultural fabric of the ranch. The three
Cavazos boys were exposed to this culture while growing up on that
ranch. Lauro Junior talked about an old ranch hand who became a great
mentor to him and his brother Richard. However, these leadership
principles first emerged from the heart of Henrietta. They were then
nurtured by her and passed on through the efforts of Robert Kleberg. The
business of war is a deadly business, but it is still an endeavor, where
the same leadership principles which shaped that King Ranch culture
needed to be applied to assure consistent and lasting success.
In Vietnam, general officers, themselves, had no experience,
fighting small unit actions in jungle terrain. I have read
Westmoreland's detailed account of his Vietnam Experience, "A Soldier
Reports", and this excellent account, gives enough information for me to
state, unequivocally, that Westmoreland understood next to nothing about
successfully engaging the enemy in the jungle, yet there were ways to do
that. The men of the 1/18th Infantry Battalion proved that time and time
again. However, when Rufus Lazzell took over the 1/16th, just like his
predecessor, he was immediately in over his head, and he stayed that way
for his entire tour of duty as commander of the 1/16th Infantry
Battalion. While under his command, the 1/16th Infantry Battalion would
suffer needless losses simply because he not only didn't know what he
didn't know, but he also seemed unable to learn from his past mistakes.
Yet, Rufus was almost the perfect example of the type of field commander
who appealed to the average general officer. He checked enough of their
boxes to allow him to once more resume his command from November 1966
through June of 1967.
On the same day Lazzell was restored to command of the 1/16th,
November 28, 1966, I was just getting off a plane to start my tour of
duty in Vietnam. If I had arrived two weeks later there is a good chance
that I would have been assigned as one of the replacements in the
1/16th. Why? Because Lazzell's lack of understanding in the deadly art
of jungle warfare had caused his C company to sustain over 50%
casualties.
It happened when the C Company commander led them into an ambush
on Dec. 11, 1966 near a place called Soui Da. They were doing a sweep
west of Highway 13 and north of Lai Khe. They approached a small
clearing about fifty meters wide and one hundred meters long. The
clearing was more or less in the shape of a fish, with its head pointing
northwest and its tail pointing southeast. Instead of zigzagging through
the jungle and skirting the perimeter of the clearing, which would have
disrupted any ambushes, Lazzell's company commander had the entire
company follow an ox cart trail. That trail opened up into the northeast
side of the clearing. Now, there were very good reasons for not
following trails. Yet, American officers at every level of command kept
making that mistake over and over. So, throughout the war the enemy
continued to exploit our willful ignorance. One reason for not following
trails was because following trails made it much easier for the enemy to
run ahead and set up an ambush. That is exactly what fifty Cong did at
Soui Da. When Lazzell's C company point men, following the ox cart trail, arrived at the edge of the clearing, the ambushers were already in place. In an often-used ruse, three Cong jumped up in the middle of the grassy clearing and started running for the opposite wood line. Their purpose was to lure the Americans into giving chase into the clearing. That’s exactly what the Americans did. While they were crossing the clearing, three heavy machine guns hidden within the wood line on three sides of the clearing opened up on them. It may have dawned on the company commander beforehand that they were becoming ducks in a shooting gallery if they entered the clearing. However, even if he thought that, he would have more than likely taken the same action anyway, as incredibly stupid as that sounds now. Why? Because he feared Lt. Col. Lazzell more than he feared the enemy. He feared not being able to please him and Lazzell had done nothing to dispel that fear. Instead, he had done just the opposite. He had used what I call poison communications to propagate such fear in his subordinates. Building a strong feedback loop between him and his subordinate commanders became impossible in this type of poisoned atmosphere. In this atmosphere, that C Company Commander had already been conditioned to do what he thought Lazzell wanted him to do, even if he had not received a direct order to do it. As could be expected, from my research, I found that a strong healthy feedback loop was practically non-existent in the 1/16th under Lazzell’s command. I can also say that Lazzell’s command was not the exception. It was the norm. At the same time, I am sure the information was there to save C Company. Later, after serving under our new commander, Dick Cavazos, for a while, we came across many clearings while on patrol. He made sure that we didn’t dare cross any of them. Instead, we picked a landmark on the other side of that clearing and very quietly skirted the perimeter until we reached that landmark. We then picked up our designated azimuth from there. There is no doubt in my mind that Lazzell’s C Company point men knew to do the same but it wasn't their choice. If only a feedback loop had existed to help critical tactics like I have just described to become standard operating procedures throughout the division. Battalion commanders could have been trained in these better jungle tactics before taking command. Unfortunately, our unit was to become the exception instead of the rule. Continuous implementation of better and better jungle tactics was far removed from becoming the norm. Most field commanders were cut from the mold of people like Lazzell. They did not have the foggiest notion of the importance of what I am saying here. Almost every single man in C Company was wounded crossing that field. Sixteen gave everything they had and everything that they would ever hope to have in life. If I had been a grunt assigned to C company, on this day I would have had no choice but to become one of those "sitting ducks". This was a travesty which could have been prevented by proper two way communications within Lazzell's chain of command. However, Lazzell should not take all the blame. Those above him should get the lion's share of blame. Our generals didn’t have a clue about what was really happening on that jungle battle field, although many times they were only a few hundred feet above the battle below. It simply never dawned on them that they needed to develop new maneuvering tactics in the first place. At the time, most were too persuaded of their invincibility by America's industrial capabilities. They just didn't give much thought to what was going on in our grunt world. Yet, it is always the grunt's proper use of industrial might, which wins or loses the day. It's not acceptable
but it is understandable why our nation lost the Vietnam
War. Our strategic thinking was all wrong. Now, winning strategies can
differ greatly for the same war. Obviously, our enemy in Vietnam chose a
winning strategy. However, a winning strategy which creates a more
enduring peace, prosperity, and freedom for people can only be acquired
by a nation's leaders who intentionally seek God's guidance first and
who are also believers in Christ. Its that simple. Our leaders in
Washington did not do this during the Vietnam War.
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