(This chapter needs some editing since talking to Jim Kasik after completion)
Six days after my unit was withdrawn from the field, the 2/28th Black Lions of the First Division were inserted into the same area to "find, "face off with" and destroy that same "ole nemesis", of the First Division, Vo Minh Triet. Triet had been ordered north by his superiors, but he needed food, so he stayed in and around the Long Nguyen Secret Zone, looking for rice for his hungry conscripts. He had attacked Lt. Col. Dick Cavazos's Dogface Battalion three times and gotten chewed up every time, but that wasn't necessarily all bad. Those defeats also meant that he would have less people to feed on the trip north. Once he reached that destination near the Cambodian border, fresh conscripts would become "a dime a dozen". There was one big rice cache (10 tons) close by which could buy his conscripts a few more days food while hiding and resting up for the long trip. They still had a well maintained and well hidden base camp deep in the Long Nguyen Secret Zone to use for a temporary hideout. Yes, my 1/18th "Dogface" Battalion had been able to counter Triet's every move, but now my unit had been pulled out and the Black Lions were taking our place. Maybe Triet would have better luck against this recently promoted Lt. Col. Terry Allen. As bad as he wanted to annihilate an American battalion, however, it would be stupid at this point to start something which he knew he couldn't finish. His conscripts were in really poor shape. What he really hoped to do was hide away for another three or four days, so his troops could build up their strength on the two remaining large caches of rice. Then, he would slip away unnoticed. However, it was not to be. There were three other First Infantry Battalions operating in the area, the 1/2nd, the 1/28th, and the 1/16th. On the 15th of October Jack Toomey's 1/2nd Infantry Battalion found Triet's last large cache of rice and a few days before that the 1/16th had found another large cache. Now, without at least some food in their bellies, it was going to be even harder for his conscripts to make the long march north to Loch Ninh. Maybe it would be just as well if he thinned his ranks a little more? Maybe another try at these Americans was in order? That would at least reduce the number of mouths he would have to feed on the march north. Win or lose, what better choice did he have? Besides, now that there was no stores of rice to be handled and transported, maybe he could use some of these local support troops to fill in the gaps. Truth was, they knew the local area better and were eager for a fight. Using support troops was not part of his plans but it was an idea to be kicked around in his mind as well as running past his close comrades in the 271st. It was also something to be tucked away as a plan of last resort. "Who knows though", Triet thought, "Depending on how things developed with this new guy, Terry Allen, it just may wind up becoming a plan of first resort".
Terry Allen, the commander of the Black Lions, was a major when he first arrived in Vietnam. He was married to a beautiful woman, and they had three beautiful daughters. Shortly after arriving in Vietnam, he had been given the coveted job of S3 (operations officer) for the Black Lions Battalion. It was that next step for anyone reaching for the stars and Terry, whether reaching or not, was well on his way to having those far-off stars come down out of the sky and land squarely on his shoulders. Our First Division commander, General Hay knew all about Terry's famous father and his exploits as the Big Red One commander in North Africa. Hay, himself, had won 3 silver stars, while commanding combat units in the famous 10th Mountain Division in Italy, during World War II. Therefore, it was only natural for the fatherly Hay to feel connected to the son of a former storied commander of the "First". It looked like nothing but smooth sailing ahead for Terry. All he had to do was keep his head down and do an average job. His was a "story book" life until a personal tragedy struck shortly after moving into his new assignment at Third Corps. His much younger wife not only started having an affair with a rodeo clown in their hometown of El Paso but had allowed the clown to move into their home with her and their three young daughters. It was a stabbing wound straight through Terry's heart. Now, Terry Loved his wife in the same way Adam loved Eve, so he took leave and went home to try and reconcile things to no avail. The underlying problem, which sabotaged both Terry and Adam's relationships with their wives was this. What both men thought was love really wasn't love at all. It was a passion filled emotion, which they placed high above a genuine love for God.
Big Jim Shelton took Terry's place as operations officer (S3) of the 2/28th Black Lions and Terry went to Division for a short time while waiting for his promotion and assignment to command a combat battalion in the Big Red One. Soon, the current Black Lion's battalion commander was fired, and Terry Allen was given that man's job. I don't believe that commander had a World War II general for a father. Once again, Terry found himself back with the Black Lions. Big Jim stayed on a while, as his operations officer, but left two weeks before the battle of Ong Thanh took place.
Jim was happily married and had six kids. He was "book smart" and wore his emotions on his sleeve. He was loyal to his military superiors in the same way he had been loyal to his football coaches in school. He unquestionably carried out his leader's commands, no matter how foolish those commands seemed and then years later spent a great deal of time trying to justify why he was right, and they were right too. Big Jim was a socializer and a talker and an all-around good guy but like so many others he walked in the light of his superiors and his own reasoning and not in the light of the Holy Spirit. He would never have dreamed of changing an order to pop smoke, as my "Holy Spirit" anointed commander, Captain Caudill had done, especially if that order had been given by General Hay. He may have realized the danger, but he never would have spoken up suggesting a change to the general's order. Quite frankly, like so many, he feared generals more than he feared VC. He certainly would not have allowed someone named the "Holy Spirit" to interject divine thoughts into his own stream of consciousness. That definitely would have been just a bit too weird for Jim. "What if" he did allow something like that to happen? Furthermore, "what if" an honest person like Jim allowed it to slip that he was hearing from spirits in the first place? Big Jim was never going to let that happen. Jim was a herd animal and he liked the safety of a herd. He also liked to act in accordance with what he could see with his own two eyes. He definitely wanted nothing to do with the companionship of a Ghost, even if that Ghost was God.
Since Big Jim Shelton was battalion S3, for a time, after Terry became her commander, he was in closer proximity to him, than any other person in the unit. With that being the case, it was only natural for Terry to start confiding in the very loyal, trustworthy, and family minded Jim Shelton. Maybe he shared the dirty details of his home life with Jim on one of those very damp drizzly dark nights, in a smelly bunker somewhere in the middle of War Zone C. Maybe he shared them because he just couldn't keep the mental anguish to himself any longer. No matter how or where Terry told Jim, however, it was shared and that was all that mattered. One black night Terry vomited the entire smelly rotten mess straight into Big Jim's Lap. Many years later the then retired Brigadier General Jim Shelton would tell the world about these shared family secrets, little knowing that he would be giving a clue to one of the "big whys" behind what happened at Ong Thanh Creek on October 17th, 1967.
On October 16th, LT. Clark Welch and Captain Jim Kasik marched their D and B Companies, respectively, out of the Ong Thanh Creek NDP in a straight line due south. Capt. Kasik had explored that same area the day before with his B Company and had run into enough signs of a large enemy presence to be extremely concerned. His point squad spotted and exchanged fire with three VC, severely wounding all three. There were heavily traveled trails also found but Kasik did not press his luck and returned to the NDP. His thoughts were that this area would then be scheduled for as air strike sometime in the next few hours. Triet, well aware of how close the Americans were coming to the several hideouts which he had available to him in this area knew that he had no choice but to do something. It was either run and have his conscripts drop like flies from starvation or have them die in battle. Triet chose the latter. He staged an ambush just off a very advantageous ox cart trail, which intersected Welch and Kasik's line of march. He pulled most of his troops out of that hidden base camp to carry out the ambush, leaving only a small security force behind. Everything was looking good until the Americans turned ninety degrees due east just three hundred meters before reaching the ambush site. Welch and Kasik had made an arbitrary course change just in time (Jim I need more info on why you and Welch decided to make this course change) and it ruined Triet's plans for this ambush. Not only had they made a course change but they were now heading strait for one of Triet's major hidden base camps in the area, which had only a skeleton force protecting it. That put Triet in a real bind to find another interception point for an ambush and find it fast. That new location would have to be the hidden base camp, itself. There was no time to prepare any other site. When the Americans arrived at the base camp, Triet was still trying to reinforce it with returning troops from the original ambush site. They had no time to properly prepare before sporadic fire broke out between the two sides. Welch was able to maneuver his men in and amongst some of the still unmanned bunkers. These bunkers and their berms provided excellent cover from the increasing volume of enemy fire, as more and more of Triet's troops returned from the original ambush site. Welch was able to call close-in artillery support as well as mortar fire from his own NDP. He also did an excellent job of maneuvering his men to occupy even more and more bunkers, as well as having others use fire and advance tactics to push the enemy out of the camp altogether. Triet's men had no opportunity to chose their ground and quickly broke and retreated under the withering fire placed on them by the Americans. The fighting started at 1219 hours and by 1310 hours, as the firing slacked off, Terry called down from his bubble helicopter and ordered Clark and Kasik to withdraw for the day. I believe Terry was planning on having the enemy base camp bombed later. Not a single one of Clark and Kasik's men was killed, due largely to their bold and decisive initiatives, but also because they made a "last minute" course change, which had put a "kink" in Triet's plans. Triet's troops had been put in too much of a rush. To make matters worse, they were tired and weak from hunger. They could not respond as fast as they normally would have been able to respond. Having to change ambush sites and reinforce an understaffed base camp in Welch and Kasik's new line of march could not be done fast enough, before the Americans were upon them.
This happenstance created a very successful morning for the Black Lions. However, Coleman and Newman got to witness a very inapt Terry Allen over the radio. That experience conjured up a real fear for Coleman and Newman that Terry was going to make a mess of things, since the job had not been finished today and there would probably be more fighting tomorrow. The blame for that mess-up would land squarely on their shoulders since General Hay was in Saigon. Something needed to be done. This guy could ruin the whole show tomorrow. It was time to do something but what? Terry was the First Division's "fair haired boy". How would they ever explain to General Hay that they had to fire Terry. Obviously, they couldn't do that but their fear was growing and when fear grows it often makes a person mad. Now, Newman, more than Coleman, was as mad as mad could be. Newman would have a "face to face" meeting with Terry and in no uncertain terms explain to him that he had not gotten enough of a body count today and secondly that he might have killed more if he hadn't quite so soon.
Never mind that Welch and Kasik had not lost a single man. When it came to overall tactics, Westmoreland set the parameters and they were parameters which favored death over life. If they had not followed his wishes then they would have been removed from command. Its just that simple. If removed, then they also stood the chance of having their careers damaged. Yes, it would be easy to say that Brigadier General Coleman and Brigade Commander Buck Newman were as dumb as a box of rocks. Looking back, however, it was pressure from above them which helped shape their own poor command decisions. They certainly weren't stupid. They were fearful but not stupid, and fearful, not of the enemy, but of the boss. When one's life is steeped in that greater Godless fear, as was the case with both these men, it becomes extremely hard to use Godly reasoning to solve problems. Newman ordered Terry to land his Helicopter and meet with him, where Newman began to give an emotional wreck of a man the most harsh chastisement of his entire life. Furthermore, Newman ended the conversation by piling on more chastisement of Terry for commanding the battle from a helicopter, instead of being on the ground with his troops.
I believe this ill timed chastisement, in some ways, was the final straw. It triggered events, which set in motion the destruction of the Black Lions the next day. The Army had been betting it's money on the wrong horse, in the first place. Now, higher command was exerting pressure on a man who was already stressed to the max and falling behind. This horse was never going to be able to win a race, any race, much less the one he would soon face. Terry had no aptitude for the job. On this last day of his life, from things others have said, I believe that its highly possible, that Terry, himself, would have liked nothing better than to have stopped the madness. I believe that he would have liked nothing better than to have resigned his command, got on a plane, and flew home to a restored marriage, his daughters, and also a completely different career. However, only God can put Humpty Dumpty together again. Although Terry had already mentioned changing careers, he was coming to this decision way too slowly. It was that single strand of lingering pride which was keeping him 9,000 miles away from his most important responsibilities under God. However, that single strand would be enough to cause his destruction. He should have already been home fighting for his family, instead of fighting VC. One should never sacrifice the welfare of their family for others or even their country. Our priorities should be God, family, and then country, in that order. When a father gets those priorities out of order than he and his family are in for big trouble and ironically, the nation is too. Yes, it is true. Dick and Caroline Cavazos were also separated a lot, by war. However, the difference was this. Their souls were "of one accord". Caroline supported Dick's efforts. Jean Allen did not support Terry's efforts in what he was doing. The truth is this. Not everyone is able to become a warrior and there is no shame in that. However, a man with a wife is always meant to make sacrifices for his wife and be a father to his children. (Eph. 5:25-31)
It seems that Clark and Kasik's successful action was also doing nothing but leading Terry further down the deadly road he was traveling. With the shock from not being able to please his superiors, for the first time in his life, and the crushed ego, which that, and a pending divorce produced, I believe it was now extremely easy for him to become side tracked from thinking of the danger he might be facing in those woods on the following day. All he had seen the enemy do was run away today and every other time too. Why wouldn't Triet run like a rabbit tomorrow? Terry's short combat experience had already lulled him into becoming more laxed about his combat duties than he should have been. He had experienced nothing but "run away scrapes" while he had been an S3 and again, after he took over as commander. In his short time in the field, Terry had been given no reason to believe that the enemy would dare go "toe to toe" with such a large and well armed force as his. If he had been exposed to more combat, like Dick Cavazos, or even 1st Division commander, General Hay, would Terry have taken such a cavalier approach to handling his responsibilities? Probably not. Would it have made a difference? I don't know. I do know this. It was unfortunate that he never had to experience the harsh reality associated with one having to stand on one's own two feet. He never fully made that transition from a son to a husband and father and that is a vital prerequisite for becoming an enlightened leader of others. Every other reason for success or failure as a leader in anything is secondary. Oh sure, one may become a leader, of sorts, but not an enlightened leader, who will leave a lasting legacy. Dick, through the shinning light of the missionary's daughter, was able to see how to do this with his own family. Getting this priority straight actually enabled Dick to serve his country better, and finally to become part of a lasting legacy. I and the men who served under him are also part of that legacy. I talked to Caroline several times during Dick's last years on earth. I assure the reader that Caroline was one with Dick, sharing the same fox holes in life with him. He could not have become what he became without her. My company commander, Watts Caudill, was another man who had his priorities straight, and this nation has been mightily blessed by both these men, through what their wives have done.
In any event, on this day, there was much greater destructive thinking "at foot" than Terry Allen's messed up priorities. That destructive thinking in the minds of high command, set the stage for the events of the 17th of October, long before Terry entered the picture. It not only was the root cause of what happened at Ong Thanh Creek but also set the stage for total defeat in Vietnam. Here is a brief explanation for what I have just said.
Westmoreland had just told President Johnson that we had turned the corner and we were now winning the war. Our First Division commander, General Hay had been summoned to attend a meeting in Saigon, which no doubt had something to do with "Westy" wanting to make sure every one of his division commanders was supporting his crazy notion, as the way to win the war. I say crazy because "Westy" believed that "winning" and "killing" more people was the same thing. That's crazy thinking unless one is prepared to annihilate the populations of entire countries. General Hay was on board with the part of "Westy's" plan to destroy more enemy forces in South Vietnam, but he had a real problem with seeing the numbers on our side of this tally sheet go up, just to support a nebulous strategy, defined by "body counts". Unlike Westmoreland, Hay had proven himself to be a real hero in front line combat, with the 10th Mountain Division in Italy. Hay knew from "up close combat" what blood bought victories looked like, and the strategy Westmoreland was promoting, though bloody, just didn't seem to be the same thing. Killing for the sake of killing and not for the sake of occupying territory just didn't make sense, not only to Hay, but to many of us grunts as well. Defense Secretary McNamara by now also doubted Westmoreland's strategy. His doubts were backed up by some of his top analysts at the Pentagon. James Gavan, who was instrumental in actually winning a war in Europe against Nazi Germany, was so disturbed by Westmoreland's flaky idea, that he paid for his own plane ticket to visit Westmoreland in Saigon. He was Westmoreland's old boss and had a lot of pull in the public, so Westmoreland spent five days trying to talk him into seeing things his way. If Gavin went to Vietnam with some skepticism, he left realizing that the vision which Westmoreland had for winning was going to lead to total disaster and he said so to the press when he returned. Westmoreland, however, remained steadfastly resolute in not only wanting to increase the numbers of enemy deaths, but he also wanted to increase the number of thoughtless, but aggressive actions, which he knew would mean the deaths of many more young Americans. Westmoreland had always considered himself to be the smartest person in the room and according to his memoirs he still thought that until the day he died. By his own words, he saw nothing wrong with trading one American life for every four enemy deaths. This was a completely acceptable figure in "Westy's" world. Since the actual ratio of enemy deaths to American deaths was around 19 to 1, the reader can see that "Westy" would have been okay if the number of young Americans killed in the war was 4 or 5 times greater than it actually was. This fact is not taking into account the vast numbers of Vietnamese deaths. God places infinite value on every human life. I don't believe anyone can truthfully say that Westy's value and God's value was anywhere near the same. What kind of mindset does it take to be so callously willingly to place such a low value on human life, before stopping to think of ways to do things differently? What kind of mind gets stuck in a place like that? Certainly not one led by the Holy Spirit.
On the 16th of October, if Dick had been in Terry's shoes, he would have allowed Clark and Kasik to do what Terry prevented them from doing. He would have allowed his men to finish the fight. Terry didn't finish the fight or actually it would be more accurate to say Terry didn't finish both fights. After withdrawing his men, a safe distance, Dick would have heaped as much fire on the contested area as possible. He would have then sent us back through the area, to mop up, with gunships covering our flanks, and artillery at the ready to blast away at anything apposing us. In Terry's case, although he had not quit too soon because he was timid, he definitely quit too soon in the eyes of his superiors, who were trying to please their superiors. Dick, unlike Terry, was always aware, that he was fighting a battle on two fronts, one with the VC, and the other with senior leadership. He knew he could never leave the battlefield before winning both engagements. However, he always won that second battle because he was competent and he was competent because he was able to reason things out in a logical way. Finally, he was able to reason, because he did not labor under that spirit of Godless fear which most, if not all our commanders labored under. (Heb. 2:10) The legacy of the ranch had mitigated this fear in Dick, protecting his formative years from it, allowing him the freedom needed to rationally learn about life. He learned early on how to recognize, and navigate most common human frailties in himself as well as others. This ability greatly freed him to accomplish the task at hand. Most people cannot begin to seek real solutions to situations arising in life, which are unique to the moment, because fear drives them to do nothing but become part of the herd. Dick's ranch upbringing, however, had been an almost perfect environment to help him grow out of that fear, and become his own person. You see, ranch life was not an isolated life. There were hundreds of vaqueros and their families living and working on the ranch. However, many times those worker would be on their own and miles away from any boss standing over them commanding every single stroke of work which they performed. Dick and his brother Lauro had no choice but to be immersed in all types of human interactions with these independently minded workers. Along with that exposure, came the many learning experiences which were just naturally a part of those interactions. This varied exposure to differing personalities helped develop an easiness in the two Cavazos boys when communicating with a variety of independent personalities. The development of these types of communication skill could have only come from life on the ranch and would serve them well in becoming the very effective leaders, which they became, whether they landed in the cabinet room at the White House or on a battle field in Korea or Vietnam. Naturally, many of the most important interpersonal skills were learned early on by the two boys continually observing their father, Lauro, "day in" and "day out". As they got older, others on the ranch and one older vaquero, in particular, played a more personal roll in their development. Lauro Jr. mentions him in his book, "A Kineno Remembers". This kind of emotional development worked hand in hand with the humility acquired through the ongoing discipline administered by their father. Circumstances in life differ but people are not all that different, whether on a ranch, the battlefield, or in the boardroom and it's usually people who "gum up" the works. Unlike Dick, Terry had a absentee father who he had only heard about from others and he was not just "any ole" absentee father, but one which the public had turned into a World War II god of sorts. This created a very tempting but imaginary image in young Terry's mind, making him want to become like that god who only existed in his imagination. Dick learned from real observations of his father, daily, but Terry had only a glorified image of his father, to go by. Dick saw his father make mistakes. Terry never saw his father much at all so how could he witness his mistakes? Instead, a desirable but imaginary image was created in Terry's mind which seduced Terry into trying to become just like his father, although he really didn't know who that man was. Never mind having to deal with the realities of life. Never mind having to deal with the fear which came with those realities of having to communicate with others. Finally, never mind pursuing the real man which God had placed in Terry's heart to become. He was too busy becoming his father to become Terry. Thus, that special man was buried forever. Terry became like that cowboy in the Willie Nelson song. He was, "Sadly in search of, but one step in back of himself and his own "slow-movin dreams". There is no indication that either Dick or Terry had a close relationship with God, but Dick's soul was enlightened and also protected by one woman's legacy, who did have a close relationship with God. The embodiment of that legacy was the ranch. Terry had no such protection. However, the reader needs to know that God circumvents the circumstances of a bad beginning, allowing us to pursue that very special person which God has created us to be. However, he can't do that until we turn our lives over to Him.
As Welch and Kasik returned to their NDP that afternoon at Ong Thanh Creek, they realized one thing and I am sure it gave each a sick little feeling deep down in the pit of his stomach. They both knew that there was something wicked still brewing in those woods. Every old veteran in the battalion also knew.
Welch was as good a junior combat officer as any who served in Vietnam. He entered service when he was 17 and volunteered for the newly formed Green Beret Special Forces shortly afterward. He then applied for a two-year direct officer's commission in 1966 and received it. Shortly after being sent to Vietnam, he was assigned to the 2/28th, which, of course, was a line unit. The shock of changing from the more autonomous atmosphere of a Green Beret, to an environment more like that shared between prison inmates and guards, must have been pretty hard to take for Welch. General DePuy, himself, chewed Welch out for wearing what he called his "silly little green beret hat" in an administration hut while Welch was processing in. By the time the Battle of Ong Thanh rolled around, however, Clark had a lot of combat experience of the kind it took in Vietnam to successfully command a small line unit. He understood how his enemy operated better than any other junior officer in his unit. Simply put, he became an incredible jungle fighter. However, to really shine Clark needed the enlightened support and trust of a savvy commander like Dick Cavazos. For one, Clark had an inferiority complex which caused him to close off and withdraw within himself, when he was around senior command. Dick would have spotted that in a heart beat and would have dealt with it. Exactly how, I can't say, but Dick had a gift for making talented people like Clark believe in themselves. Clark's first assignment in a line unit was as platoon leader of the battalion's recon platoon. However, performing stealthy observations of the enemy wasn't his thing. His platoon got into a firefight almost every time his patrol left the perimeter. By all accounts, however, his men loved him, and he trusted and treated them with respect. When the newly formed D Company showed up in July, her company commander was fired for some silly reason and Clark was assigned to take over and train D Company as her company commander. It was fairly unheard of, for this job to be given to a Lieutenant and it was a big clue, revealing to me just how much respect his superiors had developed for him. Actually, what they felt toward him was more "gut level awe" than respect. In the fall he took his new company to the field, while still wearing lieutenant bars instead of what should have been captain's bars. That was the normal rank of a company commander. Though he performed superbly, those skinny lieutenant bars were a constant reminder that he wasn't as deserving as those college grads who wore those fat captain's bars. At least, that's what his head said. Reality and his heart told him he was just as good and some times better at knowing what to do next in a "scrape". But Clark, like most, allowed his head to rule. Thus, a conflicted soul was born, leaving the door wide open for a lot of anger and resentment. Clark's mindset, though based on a lie, would also have a profound effect on the Battle of Ong Thanh.
There was a meeting late in the day, which gave Welch and Welch alone his greatest war time opportunity of all. He understood almost completely the depth of the danger facing the Black Lions. Had Welch been prepared to take on the "battle of the meeting", I believe things would have gone very differently for the Black Lions the following day. Second in command of the First Division, Brigadier General Coleman, was there. First Brigade Commander, Colonel Newman, was there. Of course, Lt. Colonel Terry Allen was there. General Hay would have been there too, but, as I have said, he had been called away, by Westmoreland, for that "little powwow" in Saigon. It's too bad that General Hay wasn't there, because I also believe, that he, like Welch, would have understood the gravity of the situation. Unlike Welch, however, he had the rank necessary, to be heard. Neither Coleman or Newman "knew squat" and Terry was in another world. Hay had been flying overhead and had been privy to every successful maneuver my B Company's Captain Caudill had made that day during the battle of Da Yeu. Hay had witnessed coordinated backup of fires along with the tactical maneuvering which Caudill had made. In other words, Hay had saw and heard on the radio what it took to beat Triet. Hay was also a "stickler" for details and I believe he would have definitely probed past Terry's malaise, forcing him and the others to discuss details of their plans for the next day's operation. (For whatever reason, neither Coleman nor Newman did this.) That probing would have given the inquisitive Hay the opportunity to spot any "half baked" thinking as opposed to what had actually worked at Da Yeu. He could have then suggested changes. When a general suggests changes to subordinates, things usually get changed. However, that didn't happen. It couldn't happen because Hay wasn't there. Instead, Welch let his fear of authority make him "clam-up" while General Hay had supper in Saigon.
As the "battle of the meeting" started, Clark Welch began talking profusely in a disjointed way, as Coleman and Newman listened intently. His actions could very easily have been compared to a rookie grunt spraying bullets all over the place in his first fire fight. Welch's mouth had never learned the importance of a "three round burst" with a pause to allow his volleys of speech to sink in. However, he did nothing that any other new and insecure attendee to a meeting of higher level bosses has not done. He "rattled" on about details of the battle which may or may not have been needing to be mentioned. It's a good leader's job to sift through and "rein in" this kind of "meeting talk" so everyone has a better chance of making at least some sense of it all. However, nothing got "reined in".
It was a stand-up meeting out in the open center of the NDP only twenty yards or so from the Helicopter which had brought Coleman and Newman there.
As inarticulate as he was, as I have said, Clark was the only commander in this meeting who knew what to do about tomorrow. However, that knowledge was never going to be shared without him being asked to share it. Few junior officers in the First Division would have. Furthermore, if he had tried to talk tactics, it would have definitely rubbed Terry the wrong way, and that was really the main problem preventing Clark from stepping up to the plate. Clark was fearless in battle but "scared silly", not of high command, themselves, but of their disapproving ways. In the First Division during 1967, Dick Cavazos was the only field commander among those, whom I have researched, who would never have allowed rank to lord over another soldier's ability to speak his mind on tactical stuff. A man could freely express himself on tactics, and Dick judged the validity of what he was saying, not by his rank, but by every word coming out of his mouth. Furthermore, when Dick was talking to senior leadership, he had no problem speaking his mind, either. Many times, it was him, who hopped on a helicopter and flew to them before they had a chance to come to him and his proven track record went with him, along with his accurate assessment of the current situation. He let the chips fall where they may, but he also was good at reading what was going to be the response of the person hit by those chips.
Welch had been under fire enough times to know that certain general maneuvers were critical and needed to be agreed upon beforehand, or else things could deteriorate into chaos too late for even a good plan to work. However, backward Army culture hindered Welch from speaking up and because deep down he felt unworthy, he was not about to break with cultural norms. Yet, as he remained silent, he also burned inside. Clark Welch probably went to his grave regretting that he had not said something during this meeting. Coleman and Newman both had just witnessed his bravery and his competence in the heat of battle and would have probably listened to any tactical suggestions which he was willing to throw out there. Coleman had come around often at Lai Khe, during the summer, when Clark was training his new D Company troops and had nothing but good things to say to him on each visit. As this meeting was breaking up, Coleman's aid handed him a silver star to pin on Clark's chest. If Clark had only been brave enough to speak up about his thoughts on tomorrow's operation? So what, if Terry's lip dragged the ground. He would not have been able to "cook and eat Clark" as we "grunts" used to say. However, it was not to be. Instead, this meeting closed, sealing the fate of more than sixty young Americans, while their last hope, General Hay was in Saigon battling another kind of battle with the spiritually blind Westmoreland.
THE MEETING on Oct. 16 1967: From right to left, 1st Lt. Clark Welch (wounded 5 times),),
Brigadier Gen. Coleman, Major Don Holleder (killed), Lt. Col. Terry Allen (killed),
Col. George (Buck) Newman (The photographer, Verland Gilbertson, was also killed.)
First Brigade Commander Colonel Buck Newman was new and in my opinion was incompetent. He knew just enough to know that Terry had not handled things right today but not enough to do anything but "knee jerk" when dealing with a subordinate like Allen. Brigadier General Coleman was the assistant Division commander and was the top guy in the division who would be overseeing the next day's operation, since General Hay was away. He too didn't like what he saw in Terry today, but didn't take Terry's actions as badly as Newman. As I have said, Welch talked first but not about anything important. Terry chimed in but also had absolutely nothing important to say. It's too bad, because at this point Coleman and Newman were ready to listen. They were smart men who may not have had a clue about how to fight in thick jungle but they were quite capable of recognizing a logical idea, when that idea was explained to them in a logical way. What they heard instead was Terry spouting out chords of nothing but mindless notes of obedience. The logical ideas stayed locked away in Welch's head because he had "lockjaw". The meeting closed with at least five important topics (air strikes, artillery, gun ships, maneuvering, prepping beforehand) to be discussed and yet none of those topics were ever mentioned. Welch was starting to fume, because he instinctively knew how important those topics were. There did seem to be a settling of nerves on Newman and Coleman's part, about Terry Allen being a good choice to command tomorrow's operation, however. Their self-talk was working. It kept saying, "For "heaven's sake", Terry was the son of a past First Division Commander and hero of World War II. There was no reason why he couldn't be just as aggressive as his "ole man" had been in North Africa". Although they still thought he had performed poorly today, tomorrow was another day, and after his "little talking too", they had little trouble convincing themselves that he would bonce back. Besides, they were just worrying over body counts, or so they thought. Actually, they, themselves, had been playing the blame game and coasting from reality so long, I don't believe the two of them had any idea as to how big the problem really was. Terry would never bounce back because he had no bounce in him in the first place. Yet, there was only one man who was able to see the real problems needing to be addressed. Terry, Coleman and Newman were blissfully ignorant, but even the knowing Welch gave in too. He, also, was too steeped in his own insecurities to acknowledge what his own good sense was telling him. It was telling him that this meeting was about the real possibility of he and many of his men going to the "The Big Sleep" tomorrow. Yet, Godless fear, in some way, blinded and paralyzed every person at that meeting.
There was other tension affecting senior command in the First Infantry Division at this time and Coleman and Newman were well aware of it. It probably fueled some of the bulling they dished out to Terry earlier in the day. It was common knowledge that Westmoreland felt General Hay moved to slow and was too careful with his men's lives. Though the action today was quite successful, Coleman and Newman knew that the low enemy body count would be scorned in the eyes of Westmoreland. Still, it was obvious that they had no idea what to do about it. As I said, no tactical plans were discussed in the meeting, and no pertinent questions were asked by these two senior leaders. In the picture, Terry looked, and I am sure, felt very small standing by that helicopter, with Coleman and Newman towering over him. It's easy to believe that at the time that picture above was taken, that Terry had no desire whatsoever to be within a thousand miles of either of those men. Sadly, while Dick would never have allowed himself to take a bruising from these two underlying of General Hay in the first place, Terry just stood there and endured the humiliation of being in the presence of the two men whom he would have preferred to be a thousand miles from. Knowing how disappointed they were in him destroyed any possibility for him to focus on the problem at hand. He felt emasculated and feeling emasculated is a very dangerous feeling for a combat commander to entertain. It is even more dangerous for the men whom they command.
Coleman and Newman didn't feel that they had emasculated anyone. Each man told himself that he had done his job and done it well. They also told themselves that it was now Terry's time to shine and make his father and the Division proud.
As the meeting was breaking up, Welch's awareness of the stubbornness and confusion in his commander's mind became all too real to him and it was making him mad. He cringed at Terry's over-all handling of the meeting. Terry had mentioned bombing a retreating enemy. Welch knew that one must first come up with a plan to make that enemy want to run away in the first place. Today, he and Kasik had been fortunate enough, to have time to maneuver and call in artillery. However, that may not be the case tomorrow. Also, in a growing number of observations lately, Welch had noticed signs of his commander's inability to visualize what needed to be done next, but he had tried to make excuses for those observations. Yet, if Welch was mad at Terry, he was even more mad at himself, for not saying what he knew needed to be said.
There was another meeting after Coleman and Newman flew back to Chon Thanh. This one was held out of the afternoon rain, inside a hex tent with real folding chairs for the attendees to sit on. The captains who were company commanders got to sit on the front row. Welch was a company commander too. However, he was a Lieutenant so he had to take a seat on the second row. It was a battalion briefing. There were about ten people at this meeting, three company commanders, Terry's S3 and S2, attached air and artillery observers and other officers and NCOs in the headquarters company. Terry was the highest ranking officer at this meeting and by now, Terry was not in any mood to entertain even the slightest probe into how he planned to handle tomorrow's upcoming operation. He was very much on edge. He had never experienced anything, since his West Point days, quite like that hazing he had received earlier by Coleman and Newman and it had scattered what little composure he had left. As a cadet, he had been taught to pass a good hazing on to that next cadet below him, usually the one who had performed the best. Unfortunately, since then, Terry had matured little. He had enjoyed a privileged life, which was now crumbling around him. A desperate longing for yester years seemed to be all he had left in life. If he could only travel back in time. Actually, life had never forced Terry to move on very far from those adolescent times. Now, in his brokenness, since he had no real relationship with God, and had not been forced to grow up, he had no recourse but to deal with Coleman and Newman's upperclassmen hazing in the same way he would have dealt with any other hazing. He would pass it on. Today both Coleman and Newman had witnessed Terry's ignorance, and it “scared the crap" out of them, because he seemed to know even less than they knew. Like him, they were also new, ignorant and resistant to learning new tactics. Yet, everyone, including them, would take the heat from Hay and Third Corps Commander Fred Weyand if something went wrong. They knew their boss, Hay, was already feeling the heat from Westmoreland. That was the reason behind the 'butt chewing". That was reality. Terry didn't get it. Terry had never had to live in the real world. Clark Welch had never been to West Point so how could he know that Terry Allen was still trying to graduate. He definitely didn't realize, that Terry was now primed to use him to make the grade. Welch did realize, however, that he knew a "thing or two" about jungle fighting, and that frustrated him because he felt he had no way to be heard, without being belittled. As I said, Terry wanted nothing to do with answering questions, as crazy as that might sound. He insulated himself even more from questions by having his operations officer, Major Sloan, lead off the meeting, while injecting corrections as he saw fit. Clark Welch was livid. He knew he needed to speak up before his men went back into that jungle like dumb sheep into the jaws of a lion. However, the "entire thing", of not knowing how to say, what he needed to say, left a huge sinking feeling deep inside Welch's stomach. He felt helpless and abandoned. Clark had no idea, that his commander was a boy pretending to be a man. Even if he had known, he would not have had the presence of mind to deal with it. Clark's concern was totally with his men and fighting tactics, as it should have been. Here is the most gut wrenching part. The critical life saving tactical information, which the Black Lions sorely needed was wrapped up in the mind of Terry's best jungle fighter, Clark Welch. All Terry needed to do was get with Clark and unwrap it. even the boy in him could have done that. That's it. It wasn't hard stuff to do. Even a bad leader has the ability to ask questions.
As men started walking away from this second meeting toward their positions for the night, Clark Welch, with pent up emotions boiling over, finally blurted out a bumbling nonsensical remark". It hit Terry squarely between the eyes. "Sir, I don't think we should go back in there tomorrow", the big man whined in a much smaller man's voice. Those were absolutely the worst choice of words which Clark could have possibly uttered. Those words hit Terry so hard that they knocked the already predisposed Terry Allen all the way back to his days as a "second year man". he now saw Welch as no warrior, but as an out-of-line "Plebe". Without thinking, "second year man" Terry immediately responded, as he had been conditioned to respond as a cadet. "You have had a hard day today, Al", he said, using the name which he commonly used to address Welch. The tone of his voice and those words, themselves, were almost perfect "second year" stuff. They formed the setup which prepared the way for the "zinger", to come. All second year cadets in those days were taught to use this standard training technique which is probably still being used today. It required a second year cadet to briefly describe to Plebes a perceived problem, and then deliver a "zinger of an order" as the solution to that problem. In reality, that "zinger" is designed solely to break the individualism of a plebe. It has nothing to do with solving real problems in a real world and everything to do with tearing down the unwashed soul of a civilian so he can be rebuilt to conform to the group thinking of a military environment. Terry paused after delivering the setup. He then delivered what he thought was a perfect "zinger". Wasn't that what he was suppose to do? "I am changing the order of the "march" tomorrow morning", the almost whispered "zinger" said, in an almost emotionless tone of voice. Captain George's A Company will lead instead of your D Company". That was it. Welch was dismissed without being allowed to speak. Why? because no competent "second year" man would ever listen to the sniveling, whimpered remarks made by a Plebe, in response to a well delivered zinger. However, there was just two problems with what had just transpired. Welch was no "Plebe" and Terry was no longer a "second year " man. Welch was a great leader and decorated war hero, of the first magnitude, who had dedicated himself, body and soul, to become that leader. Furthermore, Terry was now a commander of veterans soldiers of the highest order. They were no longer newbies. Terry's primary job now was to trust and then figure out ways to lead those men against a determined foe. He was not suppose to destroy their fighting spirit. After this last meeting, Welch and Terry would never have anything of importance to say to one another ever again in this life. Terry Allen, by that one simple change in orders, had just destined himself, and two of his rifle companies to utter destruction.
Of course they were going to return tomorrow to that same area. That's what they were there to do and no one knew that better than Clark. What Clark almost certainly meant to say was, "Sir, I think we should stop and talk about an overall plan in case we are attacked". Terry, however, took Clark's words literally and in Terry's shallow, self centered mind, as well as self-deluded mind, those words were translated into words coming from a complete novice. That novice needed to transformed into a soldier like him. It was bizarre. In reality, it was just the other way around. Welch was the adult and Terry the child who needed to be transformed into a real soldier. Terry did not realize that Welch's terribly phrased words were nothing more than cries for help. It was Clark's way of begging Terry to step up to his responsibility and give explicit instructions for he and his men for tomorrow's operation. All along Terry had been trying to fill his father's shoes but he lacked the maturity and aptitude for this deadly business. He had graduated second to last in his class at West Point. He should have taken that ranking as a huge warning sign that he was in the wrong line of work, but he didn't. A good leader always possesses the ability to read their people no matter what words come forth from their mouths. Terry was no leader. He was a follower. If he could not read his own men, whom he was with day in and day out, how could he ever hope to gain an understanding of a shadowy and ruthless foe like Vo Minh Triet? Besides, war is awful. Terry would have done just fine in some other endeavor. There are a lot of immature forty year olds making their way in this modern world. Besides being immature, he had no aptitude for killing his enemies but so what? That didn't make him inferior in some way. Guess what? Neither did Jesus. You see, not everyone is cut from the same cloth. As I have said, but bares repeating, there should be no shame associated with those who lack this morbid ability to take human life. Although it is a path which God has paved for some of the righteous among us to follow, it is not a path for all. Simply put, Terry was never a warrior and never would be one. It was his covering of pride protected by a foreboding of shame, which led him to an early death. There are an infinite number of routes in life and many pursuits but only one path and one pursuit designed by God, for each of us, to find real fulfillment. My previous commander, Lt. Col. Denton, against all odds, found this enlightened path later in life, after butting his head against a wall, as a combat commander, in both Korea and Vietnam. He was clearly not cut out to be a combat commander. However, he changed course later in his life and went on to touch many other lives and his community in an enlightened way that only he could have done. Because Terry had not developed a personal walk with God, nor did he have that strong Christian legacy to lean on, he was unable to find that enlightened path especially constructed for him. Thus, he became one more tragic victim of the darkness. He was trapped in the shadow of his father's life, never finding that bright and sunlit road which his creator had designed just for him. Unfortunately, the men of the Black Lions had no choice but to follow him into that darkness.
At 0800 hours the next morning, on the 17th October 1967, Jim George's half strength A Company led the march from the NDP perimeter, heading due south into the triple canopy jungle. Captain Kasik's B Company stayed behind and guarded the NDP. Terry Allen with his headquarters people followed behind Clark's 1st platoon. The other two platoons of D Company brought up the rear. According to recorded coordinates they were traveling on a path that was due west of yesterday's march. They stopped every 500 meters and sent out those "idiotic" clover leaf patrols. I say "idiotic" because they did nothing but slow things down, giving the enemy more time to stage an ambush. They also made it harder to retrieve wounded patrol members when they were injured during first contact. They did absolutely nothing to prevent an ambush. Terry's men walked in a double column which meant more noise, more effort, and twice as many people funneled into the killing zone of a three sided ambush. Dick would have had our single column count off, numbering ourselves so we knew which flank to cover in case we were attacked. For example, the odd number would cover the right and the even numbered man would cover the left. Terry had "walking artillery fires" dropped 500 meters in front of the line of march. That too served little purpose. Calling for spotter rounds every so often would have been a better move. Here's why. Spotter rounds would have assured that the gun crews were readily able to provide quick fires on target, but would not have worn down the gun crews, who had to carry heavy ammo and load those big guns. The enemy could easily avoid the heavy barrages of "walking fires" because the battalion was moving in a straight line, so they knew where the shells were going to land long beforehand. Traveling in a straight line also allowed Triet to easily determine where that straight line march would intersect an ox cart trail and every large ambush, which I researched, took place near one of these well used ox cart trails. It's amazing that our senior leaders never seemed to "snap" to this. Triet could not only predict the best place to stage an ambush, but also accurately estimate his enemy's arrival time at his chosen ambush site. These slow moving search and destroy operations always gave him more than enough time to place his sappers, tree snipers, and guides in position. The guides would then direct the main force into position. When commanded, NVA conscripts kept at a safe distance could be "herded" over a mile on one of these trails in less than 15 minutes. One of the reasons Welch and Kasik fared so well in the battle on the 16th of October was because they had turned east from their straight line march just 300 meters before crossing one of those infamous ox cart trails. Triet had been waiting for them to reach that trail. By switching directions, Clark and Kasik had unknowingly foiled the ambush. Today, on the 17th, however, the Americans did not switch directions before intersecting a well maintained ox cart trail, and it had taken them two hours to get there. That was plenty of time for Triet to prepare a large ambush, using mostly support troops to kick things off and keeping his weakened and starving NVA conscripts in reserve.
As I said before, captured documents and later captured prisoners revealed that Triet was originally ordered to leave this area around Lai Khe and join other forces for a planned attack on a place named Loc Ninh at the end of the month. He wasn't suppose to hang around the Long Nguyen Secret Zone but this location was nearer vast rice patties and nearby secret caches of rice. His special support troops were hustling to transport those caches to other sites closer to him but the boys in the 1/2nd and 1/16th Infantry Battalions had just erased a lot of their hard work. At this moment Triet was in a real bind. As I have already mentioned, many of his conscripts would now starve if he started them out on that long march north with no food. It was at least 50 kilometers as the crow flies, but his conscripts were not crows and they couldn't fly. Their route would have been much longer than 50 kilometers, winding through thick jungle. The further into this virgin jungle they went, the fewer the rice caches and the greater the chances of being discovered by us. Furthermore, Triet's NVA conscripts, some as young as 12 years old, were not the legendary jungle fighters described by many who reported on the war. They were growing teenagers who required more sleep and more food than an adult. In 1967-68 these brutalized "Stockholm syndrome" victims had a life expectancy of not much more than six months, after arriving to live in the deadly jungles of South Vietnam. Now, time was running out for this particular "batch". They were starving, but to make matters worse, they had just been mauled in three major engagements, by my 1/18th Battalion. Triet was a ruthless sociopath but he was no fool. He understood everything I have just said, although these facts would have been acted upon much differently by his sociopathic brain. Like all committed communist leaders he was very good at ruthlessly exploiting the hard work of others for his own benefit, while telling himself it was for the greater good. Here is the way Triet viewed his present circumstances. He could either march north and have many die on the way with no one able to fight when he got there, or he could make one more stab at overrunning and destroying this American battalion, which was tailing him. He was probably going to have to fight anyway, so why not pick the spot. Support troops were available because they were sitting around doing nothing anyway. There was no rice to distribute. They were fresh and easily motivated into taking on a big fight partly because they had no idea what they were getting into. The Phu Loi battalion was also nearby and just "chock-full" of communist sociopaths who could also help, if needed. They did know what they were getting into and loved it, almost as much as watching an unwilling village chief getting his guts "strung out" while he was still alive. However, there is no evidence that they did get involved. Triet also knew that Terry Allen had just been newly promoted, and he was also quick to note that unlike that other "ole battle axe", Dick Cavazos, he didn't seem to be as "up to the task" as he should have been. That guy seemed to know every trick in the book, and some that weren't. The communist spy ring in Saigon provided Triet with general updates on all American battalion commanders.
It was 0958 hours when the Black Lions point men arrived at that well worn trail running generally from the S.E. to the N.W and about a 1000 meters from the NDP. They spotted seven VC near the trail, who immediately ran off when they were sighted. It should have been obvious to Terry Allen at this point in his tour of duty that this was a setup. It was a common trick, played over and over by the VC on us Americans to draw the more naive commanders into what was usually a three sided ambush. The VC were already in attack positions, waiting for a signal to spring the trap. The point men of A Company started firing away at the seven VC, but these Black Lions were veteran jungle fighters, who were not foolish enough to chase after a few "Charlie's". They waited for orders on what to do next. The entire battalion was now halted and standing in place while Capt. Jim George talked to Terry and Terry talked to Col. Newman, and I am also sure that Brigadier Gen. Coleman got in on the conversation too. General Hay was still tied up in Saigon. Everyone talked to everyone except the one man, whom everyone should have been talking to, and that was Clark Welch. However, Clark was not in the lead. The compliant and inexperienced Jim George was leading the column. Clark was in the rear so all he could do was listen to the talk on the radios. No doubt, the first thing Clark would have advised Terry to do if he had been in the lead would have been to allow him to immediately withdraw and call in a wall of artillery on that evacuated forward ground. That was the only sensible move to make. However, Terry had "knee jerked" at Clark's terribly misplaced remarks the night before and changed the line of march. This placed Clark's D company in the rear, which meant that all input from Clark had now been muted. All Clark and his men could do was listen helplessly on their own radios as events unfolded up front. No one in Clark's D Company, however, could believe how "hair brained" Terry Allen's next move would be. Even 18 year old D Company PFC Peter Miller thought that this plan was the the most "scatterbrained" idea he had ever heard. The point squad of A Company was being ordered to set up an ambush on that ox cart trail. When I read David Maraniss's excellent accounting of this detail, I too was dumfounded. It spoke volumes about Terry's lack of understanding of this type of warfare, and also his inability to learn. Ambushes in Vietnam were stealthy affairs, carried out by a small force, and usually at night. An ambush was the last thing in the world which should have been considered here. Terry Allen was commanding a large noisy force trampling through the jungle like a herd of goats. Ambushes were suppose to take the enemy by surprise and usually required a lengthy waiting period for that to happen. Who, in their right mind, would ever think that the enemy was going to be taken by surprise, at this location, when an entire squad had not only discharged their weapons, but over one hundred other grunts behind them had announced their presence, by stomping through the area, to the cadence of marching artillery fires, exploding every few minutes to their front. Also, what was the rest of the the battalion going to do with themselves, while waiting on this ambush patrol to spring their trap? Did they bring their dominoes or a deck of cards with them? The question which most disturbed me, however, was, "Why in the world did Col. Newman or Gen. Coleman not countermand this, crazy idea?" They were there when Capt. Watts Caudill had demonstrated the proper tactics, during the Battle of Da Yeu. They should have known that this was a ridiculous maneuver.
Triet's "watchers" had been sending him "real time" reports on the progress of the Black Lions and had been constantly doing this since the Americans left their NDP. He gave the order to spring his ambush just as George's lead squad was moving into their ambush positions along the trail. When Triet gave the signal, the point man's body was immediately ripped open by massive volumes of fire coming from multiple heavy machine guns. Some were in trenches on the right flank and others were firing from directly to the front and south of the trail. If I had been assigned to the 2/28th, with Terry as my boss, I would have had no choice but to do exactly what this veteran point man had done, which was to obey Terry's foolish commands, and walk to my death. Within no more than a couple minutes things descended into chaos. A Company men up front were cut to pieces by a hail of heavy machine gun fire, which could easily rip through smaller trees and kill men hiding on the other side. Since sappers and small groups of those enemy supporting troops did not receive any organized return fire, the signal was given for heavy machine guns to cease firing, and small teams of support troops, guided by sappers, were allowed to rush into the "kill zone" piecemeal. Scores rushed forward and quickly stuck claymore mines down, detonating some so soon that some blew themselves up with the back blast from their very own mines. The ragtag RPG teams did the most damage. They literally blasted A company apart. These guys, who carried extra rockets to the ambush site, were in good shape because their job up until now had been to carry heavy bags of rice. Now, instead of rice, they carried numerous resupplies of munitions and weapons. Those RPG rockets were a very effective mobile artillery, but the tactic only worked, because Terry was not using his own artillery as it should have been used.
I found documentation indicating that at least 200 local support troops joined Triet's main force NVA just before the battle. These support troops were not there for the fun of it all. They were there to fight and they fought much more aggressively, but also much more piecemeal. They also brought along some captured M-60 machine guns and several M-79 grenade launchers, which conscripts in the regular NVA battalions would not have had. However, local support troops would have most certainly have obtained a few of these at this point in the war, since they had more dealings with the black market. I mention these facts because they indicate that this battle was fought differently than most other battles which the First Division fought in 1967. These local support troops were less disciplined in their maneuvers but much better at improvising, than their NVA counterparts. They were also more familiar with the area and jungle trails than conscripts, who only knew to follow the person in front of them. It's sad to think that our Army intelligence guys never seemed to think of using us old veterans to do in-depth studies of these battles to develop better tactics. If they felt their competence being threatened in some way by us, they could have had a PHD join us, so he, or she, could have taken all the credit, for putting together successful battle plans.
Heavy machine guns, fixed to shoot six inches off the ground opened up first. There was no escaping death at this point for many A Company people. To counter this, a tactic would already have had to be in place as a standard operating procedure. It would have allowed an immediate withdrawal before the shooting started. Terry's broken mind could not go there, but what about Newman and Coleman? Quite frankly, it would have been better if they had joined Hay in Saigon for lunch. When Terry's people failed to withdraw, but called for more people to advance, that was Triet's cue to cease firing machine guns and send RPG teams into the fight. Triet could have not cared less about the number of lives he had to sacrifice to kill one American. There were plenty more warm bodies where these came from. What were their families back home going to do, if he got them all killed? Were they going to vote his "slim ball" bosses out of office? OK! Okay! Let me stop my "little rant" and get back to the battle. This attack was nothing like the human wave attack this same unit mounted against Haig at the Battle of Ap Gu. That battle had been executed mostly by formations of NVA conscripts. If that had been the case here, the battle would have taken on much different characteristics. There would have been more tightly-knit formations, with whistles and bugles used to signal maneuvers. I found no evidence for this type of an attack on this particular day. Furthermore, Triet had good reason for not using the starving NVA conscripts to press home an attack. As I have mentioned, they were "on the ropes" after being decimated in those last three demoralizing battles with the 1/18th Battalion. Not only were they starving but the psychological fabric which held conscripts together was their three man cells. These cells had now been torn to tatters. Surviving members of these cells suffered great emotional trauma from watching their fellow teenaged comrades being ripped to shreds, by Captain Caudill's B company boys. They were human. I assure the reader that the horror these conscripts experienced at the hands of a very professionally led American unit like the 1/18th did not make them want to say things like, "Yippee! That was fun. Can we do that again"? I say all this to say that the preponderance of evidence from the 1/18th battles and the one Terry fought makes it fairly easy to see that Triet was predisposed to hold most of his NVA (not all) in reserve on this day and instead use those local support troops the way he did. It's not beyond the realm of possibilities, to think that most of his NVA conscripts were already preparing and possibly withdrawing from the area as this battle was winding down, since they already had orders to march to Loch Ninh. This ambush was a desperate gamble by Triet, which just happened to pay off. I believe the outcome was as much a surprise to Triet as it was to Coleman and Newman. Terry's woefully lacking tactical ability was the only reason Triet won. I really don't think he expected to win. He was simply trying to cause some damage and then get away. Those support troops, like many "back water" support troops were itching for a fight and their morale was high. They were in good shape mentally and physically. The records say 200 of them showed up so the real number was probably at least double that. They were the ones who did most of the fighting and that made this battle unique, compared to the others, which the First Infantry Division fought during 1967.
On this day, everything, and I mean everything, we Americans did, helped spell defeat. It was as if the entire command structure of the First Division had schemed to lose. That's one of the things that happens when a nation's leaders continually untie themselves from the moorings, which have kept the ship of state safe. It takes a while for a great ship to sink in those global storms, as we are experiencing now. However, it will happen if we continue to drift, and when it does it will happen very suddenly. It will be on the shoulders of young rising stars of our military to first believe in the truths briefly explained here and than put those principles into action in their everyday lives. That's what it is going to take to right that ship and it is going to take a large number of our young leaders, both civilian and military, of today to realize this or soon it will be too late.
Enemy fire was coming from three sides and from snipers in trees, shooting down on people who exposed themselves in the sunlit patches of open jungle. Americans became distracted by the screams of the wounded around them. Many others, not yet injured, knew they would be haunted for the rest of their lives if they turned their backs on their hapless buddies. So, they stopped fighting and started helping. The stupid deployment of the A Company ambush just put men deeper into the jaws of Triet's much bigger ambush. When the shooting started, it allowed the numbers of wounded and dead to rise much more quickly. Others further to the rear just naturally rushed forward, becoming "helping soldiers" rather than "shooting soldiers". To make matters worse, initially, Captain George, himself, led the charge for the entire company to move forward toward the shooting, instead of having them make a tactical withdrawal while he still had troops who were able to fight. Soon, a home made claymore mine took out most of Jim George's key people. George, himself, was severely wounded by it, and had to turn his A Company command over to First Sergeant Valdez. In those first critical minutes, more and more A Company soldiers continued rushing forward, running to their deaths, either because they were ordered to do so, or were motivated by their own self-will. As is always the case with a situation like this, order quickly broke down and too many actions no longer had anything to do with killing the enemy. The importance of that task was quickly obscured. However, it was still the most important task at hand. In a fire fight, everything needs to be secondary to killing the enemy. I realize that this is a very gruesome reality. It is so gruesome, it's no wonder that so many lost their ability to wrap their minds around such a thing. It's especially sickening to the Christian soul. Most young Americans caught up in the slaughter, on this day, were the offspring of parents who had raised their sons to make helping an injured person their first priority. It just wasn't in their makeup to ignore that person and continue looking for someone to kill. A few weeks of military training had not altered that humane way of thinking. Guys just wanted to save their buddies and that was a decent thought. It was a righteous thought. It was a thought which wins medals, but it was not a thought which was appropriate at this moment in time. Instead, it was just the kind of thinking which turned even more living young men into dead ones. At this point, the very brave, but totally clueless Terry Allen had finally allowed his lack of mature forethought to catch up with him. When Clark Welch had tried to warn him, he not only wouldn't listen, but he demeaned his young subordinate commander in the worst way possible. If Terry had listened to Welch, then a plan would have emerged and he would have given Captain George instructions beforehand to be ready to put that plan into action as soon as those first VC were spotted. That's all Welch was trying to get Terry to do, was come up with a plan. He just didn't know how to articulate his thoughts. Terry was too immature to realize that. Prior understandings before a fight started were already established by Dick with his young commanders. Again, at the battle of Da Yeu, Watts Caudill and Dick were already on the same page. If a young commander like Jim George was not told what to do beforehand, few junior commanders were going to automatically give a withdrawal command. They were afraid it would look too much like cowardice to their superiors. Yet, a withdrawal was the only tactic which would work. Dick made sure that his company commanders knew that he wanted them to withdraw. That didn't mean that the unit was going to stop fighting and run away altogether. It simply meant that our commanders were going to be smart about the way they fought. Dead soldiers can't fight. How hard should that be for a general to understand?
More than the usual number of weapons failed to fire. Radios were mashed by shrapnel and bullets. Even a normally very reliable M60 machine gun and a M79 grenade launcher malfunctioned when they were brought forward to help gain fire superiority. Was this just a "freak" occurrence or was this due to Terry's laxed battalion policies toward enforcement of the proper care of weapons? I don't have an answer to this question. I do know that the M60 was a very robust but complicated weapon. It required a man to pay close attention to the disassembling and reassembling, during cleaning. That man, handling this weapon, on this day, should not have had to wait until he was engaged in a fire fight to find out that his weapon would was not working properly. This incident was just one more clue, indicating that Terry did not have his mind on killing the enemy. Yet, its only a clue. Though I doubt very much that Terry thought a whole lot about routine matters, I have no proof. however, I cannot stress enough the importance of certain everyday routines in a combat unit. Cleaning and maintaining weapons was routine, but of paramount importance. The M-16 was a separate issue. Many of them jammed on this day, due to no fault of the individual soldier. Even when firing okay, the light weight bullet and the use of tracer rounds made the weapon a lot less efficient than it needed to be.
Of even greater significance, however, artillery fires were halted just when they were needed the most. The halt was to accommodate the Air Force, who had arrived to drop their ordinance. By now, even Terry had learned a thing or two about the effective use of these two assets. Correctly, he wanted to continue using artillery, but Colonel Newman countermanded him and shut it down. Certainly, Brigadier General Coleman and Colonel Newman should have known better. However, this countermanding said otherwise. It proved that they had not the slightest understanding, of how these two powerful weapons of war should be used. Like a child at play, Newman had just yanked these assets out of his ground commander's hands, dumb to the fact that he had now taken responsibility for winning or losing this battle. This was exactly the wrong move for so many reasons, I hardly know were to begin. Terry had not been at the Battle of Da Yeu, but Coleman and Newman had watched the whole thing from above. They saw Dick establish coordinates for a demarcation line, so the Air Force could keep bombing on the outside of that line and the artillery could keep blasting away up close on the inside without chancing an artillery shell striking a plane. Yet, Newman countermanded Terry. Also, at Da Yeu, Newman and Coleman had witnessed Captain Caudill's continual adjustment of artillery barrages, bringing those fires in ever more closely and they also witnessed his withdrawal tactics. They should have been able to learn from this real-life display of how things should be done. Yet, they seemed to have learned nothing. At the Battle of Da Yeu, Captain Caudill was on the same page with a strong field commander (Cavazos) and had very little interference from above. This allowed him to be better focused on communicating with his forward observers and maneuvering his platoons. Without Caudill's specific orders, those forward observers would have been too afraid to adjust fires as close as they needed to be. Why? Because they would have feared harming friendly troops, and receiving the associated blame which would have come with that. Caudill's mathematical brain took that responsibility away from them and upon itself, but he would not have been able to do that if he had not been backed up by an already established understanding between him and his boss, Dick Cavazos. Furthermore, the general (Hay) flying around above the battle that day, knew enough to keep his nose out of it. That was also extremely important. These factors working together produced a very formidable fighting force, even in a very messed up war. Caudill knew his stuff, but Dick was able to recognize when he needed to step in and assist, but not countermand. Flying above it all, General Hay had the wherewithal to let the entire 1/18th have their head and run with it. It was not required of General Hay, to understand every move made on the ground. His job was to make sure his ground commanders understood those moves, beforehand, themselves, by continually putting tactical training and S.O.P.s in place, which fell in line with any newly gained understanding gleaned from veteran fighters on the ground. Looking back, though Hay did not have the right boss to back him, this is nevertheless what I saw him struggle to do, although he was far from perfect in doing that. It's too bad that he was somewhat of a "lone ranger" in this effort and got no support from above. Still, I am proud to have served under him. Newman's calcified brain should have at least taken away one or two lessons from Da Yeu. With a different mindset, he could have become a great help to his ground commander. For one, Terry desperately needed help lining up light fire team gunships to cover the flanks, but there is no indication that Coleman or Newman put their weight behind such a call and there is no report on the log, that gunships ever showed up during the entire battle. Also, since the B-52's could not be scheduled to pulverize the area around the base camp the night before, why didn't they call for the Canberra's to make a bombing run as Cavazos had done, after my squad located that enemy base camp on the 18th of June, just after the Battle of Xom Bo II. Obviously, the ground commander (Terry) had his hands full at the onset of the battle, but what good is a senior officer at a time like this, if he can do nothing but belittle, countermand, and request "sitreps" (situation reports) every five minutes, while his ground commander is struggling to stay alive? Maybe someone saw these same incompetent traits in Colonel Newman, which I am seeing, because he never received another promotion after this battle. Here is the truth concerning competent leadership. It's not so much about knowing every detail of the job as it is about enabling one's people to learn and perform those details of the job, and also, it's knowing who to call to help them out when they need help. Above it all, however, great leadership has it's roots in the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, either through one's newborn spirit or by proxy through another Christian's legacy.
This same morning, before leaving the NDP, Terry's disorganized brain made another big slip-up. He didn't bring along his recon platoon. These were his best fighters. If he had brought them along, he very well may have died of old age instead of the way he did die. "Most of those boys" carried the M-14s which could do almost as much damage in the right hands, as an M60 machine gun. However, Terry changed recon's marching orders, in the meeting the night before, sending them to the West on a "wild goose chase". I can't help but wonder if brigade commander Newman's harsh treatment of Terry, on the previous day, had something to do with him making that change. In response to Newman's thrashing, was Terry trying to make some kind of passive-aggressive move by leaving recon behind? Was he thinking, "I'll show Newman how brave I am. I won't take any extra men with me"? In any case, at the very least, this was just another poorly thought-out command, by Terry, indicating that his heart was not in his job. Whether Terry was trying to prove something to himself, or to Coleman and Newman, doesn't really matter.
I do know this. A real leader should never have to prove anything to anyone. Real top notch leadership is in the knowing and doing of a thing, while saying "damn the torpedoes". (John Paul Jones) Dick Cavazos did that early-on, as a young Lieutenant in Korea. He was able to do the "right thing" because his subconscious mind had been conditioned by his upbringing to do that "right thing". And yes, he was very quickly torpedoed for doing it. Here is what happened. When his position was overrun in Korea, he did not wait for orders to safely withdraw his men from a hill that they were occupying. He then went back, himself, with a few volunteers, and led the wounded, who were left behind, to safety. A superior wanted to torpedo him with a court marshal for withdrawing without orders, but instead, when the dust settled, he was given a silver star. Doing the "right thing" should always trump blind obedience. Here is why Dick was able to make those tuff choices to do what he did. He was already motivated to follow Godly principles long before he joined the Army. Godly motivated acts are synonymous with doing the "right thing" but where did this motivation come from? It didn't originate from inside Dick. It didn't originate from his father or Army training either. The root source of his selfless motivation came straight from his Christian Grandmother and the moral underpinnings of the ranch, established by Henrietta King. Sure, it takes specific job knowledge to be successful, but without the proper moral underpinnings to motivate us, the fruits of that job knowledge, although grandiose, will produce nothing more than a "Tower of Babel". In comparison to Dick, as a child, Terry enjoyed all the cultural and financial benefits which allowed him to choose pretty much any path in life. However, the tragic difference in Terry's life, compared to Dick was this. Terry, like so many of my "baby boomer" generation, was severely lacking in that delicate moral underpinning needed to condition his mind to do the "right thing" in every little instance of life. Thus he was motivated to take that next promotion, but not to except the responsibility, which came with it. Simply put, Terry had been allowed to skate, by an ever growing leadership, which was also morally skating, themselves.
Now, during what had quickly turned into a fiasco, Clark Welch tried to do his best. He was the very archetype of the American soldier, but this time being the best was not going to be good enough. He needed a commander who could release him to be that incredible soldier that he already was. However, Terry Allen was never going to be that commander. All by himself, Clark could not perform miracles and the Black Lions now needed a miracle. Only the enlightenment of God produces miracles. Yes, Terry had been allowed to skate, and now his grunts were paying the bill. Since Captain George was severely wounded and had turned what was left of his company over to First Sergeant Valdez, Terry Allen now ordered Valdez to withdraw north. However, that became extremely hard to do because of the large number of wounded which needed to be helped. Still, Sergeant Valdez did his best to rally his tattered company, leading his men in the direction of the least amount of incoming fire. That path was not due north toward the ranks of D Company, because D Company people were returning fire in the direction of anyone retreating north toward them. How messed up was that? Valdez was forced to take his wounded men and the ones who were able to carry them almost due east. He traveled around a hundred meters or so, before stopping and setting up a fighting perimeter. Now, Valdez's men were in a world unto themselves. They were so weak that they would never have been able to fend-off an assault, nor were they in a position to provide reinforcement for Clark Welch's D Company. There was a lull in the firing for about thirty minutes, while Newman's two useless air strikes were taking place. Those air strikes were dropped in the middle of nowhere, but they did serve one vital purpose to aid the enemy. Their off target location signaled to Triet that who ever was orchestrating these air strikes as well as the stoppage of artillery fires didn't know "what the heck they were doing". Furthermore, Triet's diversionary sniper fire on the NDP was now working beautifully to draw gunships to the NDP instead of coming to the aid of Terry Allen's beleaguered A and D companies. It was an "almost too good to be true" situation for Triet, so he rushed more reserves down the ox cart trail on D Company's left flank, where they spread out and reeked havoc on Clark's left flank. They hit Clark first with a devastating machine gun attack followed by multiple RPG attacks. Welch was wounded a total of five times while trying to turn himself into a one man army. Even the operation's officer, Major Sloan joined in on the act of "Gee, let's see how I can help kill more Americans". When Triet rushed in more reserve troops on Welch's left flank, Sloan cancelled Welch's call for his own unit's mortar fires to be used to suppress this new attack. Major Sloan believed that using those mortars in triple canopy jungle would be a violation of First Division S.O.P.. This order was supposedly issued by General Hay. Sloan explained later that the order was issued because of the danger of "tree bursts" which could injure friendly troops. I know of no such order and I served in the field under Hay for a long time, on the receiving end of that kind of mortar fire support. I also know from first hand experience that those mortars could have made all the difference in the world.
According to the log, Terry was killed around 1220. Just before he was killed the "several times wounded" Clark Welsh ran over to him and then begged him to do something. "Either call in artillery or give me permission to call in artillery", Welsh screamed. Terry responded by saying that he couldn't call in artillery because it would fall on his own wounded people. Welsh grimaced and watched as Terry pulled out a picture and started starring at it. Shortly after that a machine gun round took the top of Terry's head off and he fell forward, dead. Clark looked at the picture which fell from Terry's hand. It was a picture of his three little girls.
The fight was largely over about thirty minutes after his death. Most of Triet's support troops heeded the call to withdraw. A few didn't. There were a few crazed diehards, lingering, combing the woods for souvenirs and a chance to kill one more American. Clark Welch's last memory of the battle, before passing out and waking up in the hospital, was his "first sergeant" Barrow shooting at him. Welch found out later, while in the hospital at Long Binh, that Barrow was actually aiming at a VC trying to lift him to his feet. Was the VC trying to take him prisoner? Who knows? At 1230 hours Buck Newman landed at the NDP and took command of the Battalion. Originally held in reserve, C Company was now in the midst of being "choppered" into the NDP from Chon Thanh. Med-evac "dust-offs" were on the way to evacuate the wounded. From what I can tell, Buck did a very good job of organizing things in the aftermath of the attack, but he did make one more fatal mistake. While leading a rescue party several hundred meters south to better coordinate the landing of "dust-offs", he failed to corral his young operation's officer.
Thirty two year Major Don Holleder had been a star football player for Army, and was somewhat of a national sports celebrity. Senior officers loved having him around. He was a go-getter with a physically commanding presence. As more and more stragglers came out of the jungle and were crossing paths with Newman's work party, Holleder begged and got permission from Newman to turn some of these grunts around so they could lead him back south to search for more survivors. In other words he wanted to enter a "still active combat site" with a few "spent grunts". Well, okay. That was a perfectly normal request, coming from a man like Holleder, but Buck should have known better. "For goodness sakes", occasional rifle shots were still ringing out in the direction that Holleder wanted to go. Medic Tom Hinger, was one of those stragglers picked to go with Holleder. Tom had already been exposed to the worst of the fighting on this day and would be one of thirteen guys who later received a silver star. Once Tom and this little group of men started out, retracing their steps for Holleder, Don soon outpaced everyone. In other words he became his own point man, a job he was woeful lacking the skills to perform. What was he thinking? Was he thinking that this would be like the time he ran onto a football field and saved the day for Army? Years ago, that had actually happened. Holleder had gotten his picture on the cover of "Sports Illustrated" when he led the underdog Army to a victory over Navy. Is that what he thought he was doing now? I have no idea, but whatever his thoughts, I find his actions very disturbing. I can remember seeing my own officers do things that they should not have been doing. It always made me "cringe", while the same two thoughts would always flash through my head. The first thought was, "Sir, how in the world am I going to work those confounded radios if you get yourself killed". The second thought was, "Sir, why don't you trust me to do my job and you take care of your own job". Running ahead of one's people, in any endeavor, but especially in war, is not the way to become a great leader. Good leaders need to live so they can help their people not only live, but win. Now, once more Holleder would make the news, while his three girls would grow up without a father. One burst from an enemy AK-47 and a bullet cut a main artery in his chest, maybe the heart, itself, and he was dead before "Doc Hinger" reached him.
Finally, as darkness fell, Triet moved off to the west and then turned north to "force march" his conscripts toward Loc Ninh. My B company settled into another night of pulling security around the perimeter of Phuoc Vinh. My entire battalion (4 companies) had arrived at Phuoc Vinh on October 13, 1967. I convoyed in, from Lai Khe with the rest of the support troops, or was flown in by a Chinook. I cannot remember which. A, C, and D companies left us B company folks at Phuoc Vinh and were flown to a place north of Quan Loi named Song Be on October 15, 1967. That was just two days before the Battle of Ong Thanh. I never made it to Song Be but I did enjoy Phuoc Vinh. I ran errands for anyone who needed wheels. I watched reruns of "Combat" projected onto a bed sheet, sometimes in the rain, and slept on a cot in a tent out of the rain every night. Sometimes, I went to my favorite little restaurant in town, which served the most delicious rice patty shrimp. I did this for lunch every chance I got. I usually arranged those lunches to meet up with other grunt buddies who could wiggle free from pulling patrols and perimeter guard. "The crazy VC", who took pleasure in harassing Phuoc Vinh's perimeter, did his "thing" about once a week. It just so happened that I got to experience his little show one night just after dark. For about fifteen minutes he sprayed tracers from his AK-47 toward the perimeter and that was it. There was no encore. Yet, when he did this, it would require the entire post to stop what they were doing, grab their weapons and man their assigned combat stations. Big Jim Shelton had gotten to experience this display while he was operations officer with the Black Lions. Jim got mad at his battalion commander because he would not allow him to call for an "all-out" response from the perimeter with everything they had. This would have included blowing claymores, dropping mortars, and artillery as well as opening up with blind rifle and machine gun fire on at least that one affected side of the perimeter. When I read about Jim's account of this many years later, he was still blaming his battalion commander for not allowing him to do such a thing. I cringed. Returning fire in that manner would have given away every position on the perimeter and that was just one of several reasons why this would not have been a smart move. Jim's battalion commander made the right decision. As the "Crazy VC's" wild firing continued, those support troops like me, who didn't have an assigned combat position found a bunker anywhere we could, until the all-clear was sounded.
We support troop grunts received no news of the disaster at Ong Thanh. I suppose that had something to do with Phuoc Vinh being in a totally different war zone (D). The battle was fought in War Zone C. Other than that reason, I really don't know why the grape vine got no word of it. Westmoreland quickly allowed a lie to be spun as the cover story for what really happened. The world news organizations were told that the Black Lions had headed off and prevented a planned attack on Saigon. It's always better for a leader to say nothing, than lie.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYhKbBrRHHo