On the 13th of June,1967, while we stayed behind, pulling base security in those same “scorpion infested” bunkers at Lai Khe, Lazzell's "Rangers" joined Operation Billings and took a fifteen-minute chopper ride to make an air assault into cleared jungle northeast of Lai Khe, in what war planners labeled War Zone D. The clearing in the middle of thick triple canopy jungle was named LZ (Landing Zone) Rufe. This operation would be Lazzell's last trial by fire. If one counts the painful surgery and recovery time, after receiving his disabling elbow wound, he had spent almost twice as long in a mind rending environment, as the average American officer, in Vietnam would spend. 

       As brave and as determined to lead a combat unit, as he was, however, Lazzell was a misguided leader of men. Now, a misguided leader displays the fact that they are misguided in many ways, but one of those manifestations is found in the development of what has been described as "little man syndrome". My Vietnam saga led me across the path of a handful of men under six feet tall, who were nevertheless "big men", but Lazzell was not one of them. Lt. Col. Cavazos was under six feet, but he was a "big man". General DePuy was under six feet, but he was a "big man". The tall handsome General Hay, though lacking the instinctive qualities it took to understand jungle fighting, was a "big man". On the other hand, Westmoreland was tall and handsome but small in his thinking. "Little man syndrome" is a malady, which causes it’s victims, to continually measure themselves by this world's standards. To gain statue in their own minds "little men" believe it's necessary to gain the approval of those around them, whom they perceive to be greater than themselves. However, they place very little value in seeking the approval of The God of heaven, Who is the greatest of all and they tend to show very little compassion for those beneath them in status. This errant mindset can put them on one dead-end path after another, desperately holding on to each successive path, until it either crumbles to dust in front of their very eyes or death finds them. There is no lasting peace for a "little man". He is never comfortable with himself, or with anyone else, for that matter.

        In Lazzell's case, his "little man" ways continually created more problems, than he could clearly think through. That is why he had gotten wounded in the elbow, in the first place. Shortly before making this air assault into "LZ Rufe", he had assembled his men and bragged that his "Rangers" had logged more continuous time in the field than any other Army unit in Vietnam. He was so out of touch, that he did not realize that his motivation for making this morale busting statement was to build himself up and him alone. It did nothing to make his troops feel better. All they needed to hear from him, was what an excellent job they had done, in the face of some long, grueling and dangerous hours in the field. But "little men" do not think like that. By this time, every "ole guy" in Lazzell's unit knew that when they took a walk in the jungles of Vietnam, especially with Rufus, more than likely, quite a few would not be coming back. Why, in the world, would they want to make that walk longer instead of shorter? After he made this statement, is there any wonder that there was low murmuring and cussing under his men's breath, much to Lazzell's out-of-touch surprise? What they really heard from Lazzell was this. "I will run this unit into the ground and get as many of my men killed as necessary, as long as it elevates me in the eyes of myself and my superiors." Years later, before I knew his name, I remember thinking to myself how fortunate I was to have had Cavazos as my commander, instead of the man who commanded the 1/16th Infantry. Cruelty is also often the companion of the "little man" and berating a subordinate publicly in front of that person's peers is not only cruel but very destructive to any organization. It not only injects paralyzing fear and anger into the hearts of subordinates, but it reflects on a leader, himself, since he is responsible for every action of every person under his supervision. Yet, years later, I have learned that Lazzell publicly berated one of his fallen platoon leaders in the worst conceivable way, by calling him a criminal in front of the entire battalion. The truth was, like a chip off the "ole block", the untested and inexperienced platoon leader had gotten himself and most of his men killed, while imitating Lazzell's very own example, which was to rush forward in first contact with the enemy, before logically thinking things through. By trashing this poor fellow, in front of his men, Lazzell was really trashing his own standing as their leader.

       Here is a final note on this malady. It predisposes it's victim to continually jump at superficial ways to prove that they are doing a decent job, masking their feelings of inadequacy. However, these feelings still exist, severely hampering the ability to tackle real problems as they arise. A "little man" continually knee jerks, making bad judgments. Bad judgments lead to bad decisions, which have destructive consequences. Those consequences are then magnified when an organization is under some type of outside pressure. In 1967 Vietnam, there was no greater outside pressure on a leader in The Big Red One, than that created in the crucible of jungle warfare. However, having said what I have just said, it’s only fair for me to ask myself what the reader may already be asking. "What gives me the right qualifications, to criticize any leader, anywhere, in any endeavor, since I have never been one, myself? It's true. On June 13th, 1967, while Lazzell was just four days away from getting his men shot to pieces for the last time, I was one of the lowest ranking grunts in the First Infantry Division. I also went on to become a college dropout, who would never be given a leadership role of any kind, during my entire life. In other words, I would always be a grunt. So, again, what gives me the audacity to think that I can accurately access the mental condition of others who have strived to achieve a lot more in life than I? The answer to that question may come as a surprise to the reader. You see, I have the ability to understand "little man syndrome" so well, because I was one. Before I submitted my mind to be conformed to the mind of Christ, not only was I a "little man", but my affliction was so severe, that I could easily have been mistaken for a "Lilliputian".

      A Hot meal in the field was another especially crucial factor, in keeping up morale of any unit. Dick expanded the one hot meal a day to include dehydrated vegetable beef soup and fresh hot donuts in the morning. Most battalions were fortunate to get one hot meal a day, but I have never read about a single Vietnam veteran getting “piping” hot donuts, airfreighted to him in the in the middle of the jungle every morning. However, we did. Yes, it's true. They were not good for a young man's long-term health, but they were "gooood" not only for boosting morale, but also for giving us the "sugar high" we needed, to carry an extra 80 pounds of gear in sweltering 95-degree temperatures. Clean fatigues also started being supplied to us more regularly after Operation Junction City. No doubt, Dick had a hand in that. It is surprising what Dick could get our people in the rear to do just by expressing to their face what an an important part of the war he thought they were. This tact worked much better than treating his people like we were new recruits in basic training.                      

      I have described just a few of the many significant changes, which Dick made, after assuming command. I could go on and on, but I believe I have made my point. By this time in Dick's tour, he had turned the 1/18th into, as good a combat unit, as existed in 1967 Vietnam for the type of combat we were facing. His animated way of initiating and explaining the benefits behind routine commands, always had an earthy and unmatched characteristic, unique to him alone, among the 9 battalion commanders. I never once saw him bully or try to intimidate a grunt. When he spoke to the battalion, there was not a man in the unit who did not listen and listen intently, because whatever he had to say was always extremely engaging and important. Yes, he was the complete package, and by now that package had laid a foundation, which would allow us to withstand anything which Thanh could throw at us. And yet, we were sidelined for the likes of Lazzell.

      Although, Dick was not just a good commander but one of the best to ever come down the "pike", at the beginning of Operations Billings in June, he was once more sidelined. Lazzell was chosen to lead the operation. If this trend continued for just a short while longer, Dick's part to play in advancing the much larger legacy of Henrietta King may never have happened. in other words, if Dick had missed the upcoming battles in the fall, he would never have gotten the chance to prove himself to be the great combat leader, whom he actually was. He most surely would not have gained the battlefield credits necessary, to propel him high enough in rank, to affect the rescue of another great leader's military career. That leader, whose career Dick later rescued, was Norman Schwarzkopf. Schwarzkopf's career had been sidelined in a dead end job. It was four star general, Richard Cavazos, who recognized his great leadership abilities and strongly recommended him to Norman's boss, who then picked him to lead the Grenada Campaign and the rest is history. However, this chain of events was not to be, because Dick was never going to get the opportunity to prove himself in Vietnam. To make matters worse, he was not predisposed to do anything to change this. Do do that, he would have had to become a "show boater" and that's what "little men" did. Dick was certainly not going to perform "little man" stunts to get noticed. He was just too "big" to fit through that "little man" door. It is easy now to see the irony. The character traits, which gave him the attributes of a great leader, at the same time, were the very reasons, why he would never be given the opportunity, to be noticed so he could become that leader. Other battalion commanders, like Lazzell, would continue to mindlessly make "knee jerk" decisions, which nevertheless fit the predominantly "little man" way of doing business in the First Infantry Division. Therefore, commanders like Lazzell would continue to be placed at the forefront of every operation, while Dick's remaining three months would end, leaving his career to fizzle into a great retirement for him but never into that God ordained mark it was destined to be. Of course, he did make that mark, but I very much doubt that Dick ever realized how or why that happened. As far as Dick was concerned, he was completely content with himself. In a phone conversation, he once described his promotion to four star general, as "A Moon Shot". I cringed when Dick made this remark. I wanted to say, "No Dick; it was not a moon shot. Instead, you were made a part of God's grander picture, which is too large and yet too sure for the human mind to completely understand. Mediocrity and chance are not descriptive words, to be used when describing a "divine legacy". During Operation Billings, the hand of God would turn the tables and create a much greater opportunity for Dick, than he could ever have imagined, and it was not for Dick's sake alone, but to enhance God's kingdom. The grunts, whom Dick commanded and whom Dick cherished would open that door for Dick. Of course, I like to think that The Holy Spirit used the lowest ranking grunt in the entire 1/18th Infantry Battalion, to be the one, who first cracked open that door, but I'll let the reader be the judge of that.  

      On the 13th, when Lazzell landed at LZ Rufe, his Rangers were unopposed. However, intelligence reports had made it noticeably clear that the 271st NVA regiment had not only been completely rebuilt, after the battle of Ap Gu, two and a half months before, but had now moved many miles further south using numerous base camps, as staging areas to mount an attack on the large American base at Phuoc Vinh. The area was crawling with enemy patrols as evidenced by the large number of small unit contacts. Other American units, like Jack Toomey's 1/2nd, had air assaulted into an area several klicks S.E. of LZ  Rufe the day before. Toomey arrived in the operational area, just after sheets of rain had finished dowsing the landing zone with a heavy down pour.

      Lazzell was placed in overall command of both his own unit and also the Black Lions, who landed after his unit landed. They were commanded by LTC Jerry Edwards. That night the Black Lions had two ambush patrols make contact with enemy patrols. This, in itself, should have been a red flag to all field grade officers in the unit, because it was rare for even one "night ambush patrol" to make contact, much less two. Next morning newly minted Buck sergeant, Greg Murry, and his A company made a sweep one thousand meters to the west of their NDP, then turned southeast to go another thousand meters. The fog from the light drizzling rain during the night gradually lifted, allowing bright shooting rays of sunlight to pierce open areas in the overhead canopy, which then brightly illuminating patches of jungle flooring below. At 1215 hrs., one of Murray's machine gunners, Jose Garcia, was at the right place, in the line of march, to catch a glimpse of five VC congregating in one of those bright patches of sunlight, just ahead of him. They were startled by the approaching Americans and wasted no time scattering into the darker jungle foliage around them. Jose squeezed off several three round bursts, in their direction, shooting from his hip, before his gun jammed. None of the runners went down.

      Two hours later, as Murry's A company was finishing it's sweep and returning to the NDP, Murray could hear gun fire in the Jungle to the west. Capt. Ulm's B company was coming under some small arms fire, as they made a sweep about 1800 meters west of Murry and the NDP.  Earlier, the 271st NVA field commander had his sappers determine the direction of B company's march, shortly after they left their NDP perimeter that morning. American formations hardly ever changed course on a sweep. Instead of zigzagging, Ulm was forced to follow First Division S.O.P. requiring the time-consuming clover leaf tactic. Now, not only did the enemy know the general direction that B Company was traveling, but just as with the battle of Prek Klok I, their slow clover leaf tactics gave the enemy plenty of time to choose and prepare a good ambush site. As in the battle of Prek Klok I and Ap Gu, this commander used his savvy sapper teams to herd the "brown uniformed deplorables" into position. They again would do the dirty work of charging the flanks. What did it matter that some would be blown apart by artillery fire or killed by their own crossfire, from the other flank? A communist commander had no messy human rights laws to stymie his tactical imagination, on the battlefield. While training the constant resupply of young bodies in brutal training camps, it was completely permissible for Thanh's subordinates to publicly execute one or two of these conscripts now and again. The resulting message of fear loosed by those summary executions clamped down hard on any freewheeling thoughts the rest of these unfortunate souls might be having, concerning the part they were expected to play in this war. Ironically, in most conscripts, this fearful type of treatment produced the very desirable effect of splitting the soul, and redirecting the fear for their communist henchmen, into the outward motivation to perform all types of self-willed maniacal atrocities against us Americans and the South Vietnamese people. Later, leftist media organizations across the globe would gloss over the hard cold facts, pertaining to the realities of life, under the totalitarian rule of a communist government like North Vietnam. When referring to these fighters against freedom, they would use descriptive words and phrases like 'well disciplined", "committed", "experienced", 'legendary", "seasoned", "storied", "highly motivated", "brave liberators" and "best soldiers in the world". One such leftist leaning reporter compared Ho Chi Minh to George Washington. In fact, well over 90% of Thanh's forces were nothing more than terrorized teenagers, who had quickly fallen prey to a psychosis known as "Stockholm Syndrome". Only a small percentage, which included the sappers teams and local communist party members, were true believers.    

      The amount of initial incoming fire indicated that B company had made contact, with a much smaller force than was actually the case. So, Ulm followed S.O.P. and withdrew his men a safe distance anyway and then called for a good artillery shelling of the area. In less than 20 minutes, the shelling to his front was finished and Ulm started moving forward again. Unfortunately, he never changed directions to elude an ambush and even while he was still calling in artillery to protect the front of his column, the enemy commander was funneling his "deplorables" down both flanks. Soon, Ulm found himself boxed in and taking tremendous fire from three sides. It was now obvious that Ulm was up against a much larger force, than indicated by the initial contact. Needless to say, things got messy. B company started taking casualties. Two "dust-offs" (medevac) were damaged, by enemy gun fire, while trying to reach the wounded. Air strikes were requested, but were all but useless, because of Thanh's technique of holding on so tight to the enemy's belt, preventing fire support from killing his troops without killing Americans as well. It was now again up to Captain Ulm's veteran gun slingers in B company to come through for him just as they had in the battle of Prek Klok I, and so they did. The shootout lasted four and a half hours. After it was over, once again the air force would receive most of the credit for saving the day, but was that really the truth? Although the air force may have killed their share, who strayed further back from the point of contact, in this case, it was captain Ulm's veterans, who methodically whittled down the enemy attackers all afternoon, thus saving themselves. The air force did do its part by making it impossible for the enemy commander to assemble fresh troops to throw into the fight. B company lost only six men killed and 15 wounded during this very long battle, which is a real testament to the truth of my description of the fire fight and the skill exhibited by Captain Ulm and his boys in B Company. Official enemy loses were sixty killed, but it is easy for anyone with half a brain to realize that finding and counting bodies in thick jungle is not an easy task. Enemy losses could have easily been double that number. Did these losses phase Thanh and his field commander? Absolutely not. There was an almost endless supply of replacements flowing down the Ho Chi Minh Trial, as this battle progressed. Oh, how nice it was for a hater like Thanh to have complete control over whether or not his fellow countrymen took their next breath, with no negative consequences to himself, either way. Thus ended the Battle of Xom Bo I.

      The next couple days saw the Rangers and the Black Lions making company size sweeps, which resulted in no large scale enemy contact. On the 16th of June, Sgt. Murry was enlisted to use his skill with explosives to clear an area near LZ Rufe of trees. This was done to make the enemy believe that another LZ was going to be created, for more troop landings. It was a naive ploy, at best. Sappers, watching from their perches in the 150 Ft. tall trees around him, monitored and reported on Murry's progress. They also maintained "high perch" positions in several trees, surrounding LZ Rufe, with standing orders to report back on any changes in troop movements in and out of LZ Rufe's perimeter. The enemy didn't care how much work we Americans did, in the meantime, while they waited for their next opportunity to attack. They already knew that we Americans didn't "stay put" anywhere, for more than a few days, so Thanh's field commander "settled in" on a tentative plan to watch and wait for the "tactically challenged" Americans to make a mistake, either extracting troops or bringing more in. As they watched and waited, there were always side shows to behold, like Murry was putting on for them now. At this moment, Murry was moving from tree to tree in the false LZ, placing his C-4 charges, as the engineers, working with him linked them together with long strings of detonator chord. The explosions caused every tree to collapse at once, but it also did something else. The violence of the explosions shook the ground in the clearing around Murry. That upset every colony of black ants in the entire clearing. These were the same kind of ants which welcomed me to Vietnam on my first patrol. They could sting and bite and they now went after Murry, as he began to place his explosive blocks of C-4 on his next line of trees. Both Murry and his engineer friends were now having to jump up and down to shake off the furious little beasts, before they found a patch of bare skin to sting and bite. About fifty yards inside the wood line and sitting high up in his jungle perch, there was a sapper, clutching a Russian carbine, and watching the show. I can imagine him lazily sighting his rifle in on Murry and thinking what fun it would be to nail him, at the top of his jump, just to watch him crumble to the ground. However, that would be very foolish, and he knew it. If he did that, he would be doing the same thing the Americans were doing with the ants. However, instead of stirring up an ant's nest, he would be stirring up a hornet's nest and these hornets had five-hundred-pound bombs for stingers. So, he lazily yawned, laid his rifle back across his lap and continued watching the antics.

     Also, on the 16th of June, while the engineers were working to improve the clearing for landing large helicopters at LZ X-Ray, one of their security teams got into a fire fight with a small number of "black pajama sappers" on the northern end of the clearing. Their security patrol had run into them just inside the wood line. The sappers were there to observe the engineers and also to familiarize themselves with routes to the clearing. In case of a later attack, they would then become guides for the brown uniformed conscripts. No American was hurt during the fire fight, and the sappers withdrew a short safe distance, knowing that this group of engineers would not follow. This enemy contact was most certainly reported to Lazzell. The engineers finished their work and were flown back to Lai Khe that afternoon, probably never realizing the extreme danger they were in, during their time spent in the clearing. Fortunately for them, Thanh's field commander had bigger game in his sights.

      On the 13th, the 1/28th Infantry Battalion had discovered a huge regimental size base camp with 150 unmanned bunkers, just south of LZ Rufe. Actually, this was only one of many hidden unmanned base camps. They were scattered from this current area of operation, throughout War Zone C and D, all the way to the Cambodian border and beyond. Local VC units were placed in charge of guarding and maintaining them. The very next day after having his ranks thinned by Captain Ulm, Thanh's field commander, Colonel Vo Minh Triet, had already received more khaki uniformed conscripts just hours later, coming from another hidden base camp just north of his current position. They had previously been "hop scotched" toward the general Phuoc Vinh area day after day, from training camps just over the Cambodian border. Now they waited in these bunkered camps scattered throughout the area to become replacements, as needed, like pawns on a chess board. NVA units did not need to hike all the way back across the Cambodian border to replenish themselves. If they were somehow shot to pieces by us Americans, the supply chain was constantly being resupplied with warm bodies from other nearby camps. This logistical tactic continually ensured the staffing and resupply of the ninth division in a very timely manner. I reiterate, that these were not hard-core troops, but inexperienced young rice farmers from up North. In this way, staffing and resupplying the 271st NVA Regiment, took only hours, not months. It was not as easy to make up loses in the ranks of the sappers, like the one watching Murry do his little dance routine with the ants. As with American special forces, those were composed of the more "brain washed" locals who were intimately familiar with the people and the trails in their local area. Most of them were "true believers" who, like our own college students today, had drunk the "cool aid" of the poisonous Marxist ideology. They were also much harder to replace. For the most part, though, it was as if Triet had not lost a single man in the shootout with Ulm. By the time the next battle on June 17th rolled around, he was fully staffed and ready to go.

      I don't think most American Generals had much, if any understanding, of the battlefield that was Vietnam. If they had, they would have soon realized that the strategy of attrition actually worked in favor of the communist, instead of us. The communist mindset is not one which is simply programed to endure high losses of human life, but is one which many times delights in those losses. Many times those losses are looked upon as a purge of the weak and undesirable. Westmoreland probably went to his death thinking he knew and understood. However, he didn't know and he certainly didn't understand. In 1974 he revealed his willful and continued ignorance, when he made the following remark. "The Oriental doesn't put the same high price on life as does a Westerner. We value life and human dignity. They don't care about life and human dignity". That statement couldn't be further from the truth. To the contrary, here is the truth. Without "the love of God" which is placed in a believer's heart, at the time we become "born of the spirit", there is no light whatsoever, no matter what the ethnicity, to care for others, period. In Vietnam It was the communist ideology, not race or culture, which caused the callous disregard for life. Also, the very nature of Marxism ensures that only sociopaths will rise through the ranks to the most powerful positions in government. If Westmoreland had understood this truth, perhaps his mind would have been more open to a very different strategy. Instead, his own callous disregard for human life, allowed him to latch onto his simplistic and morbid "body count" strategy with such blind resolve, that it shocked even the natural senses of average Americans.    

       The decision was made by brigade, that on the morning of June 17th, the two battalions under Lazzell's command would move by foot to another clearing 1500 meters north, which had been prepared for them the day before, by Captain Pascareli's C company, of the 1st engineering Battalion. Those engineers had blasted down trees, in the destination at LZ X-Ray to make sure resupply helicopters could land safely. This work occurred at the same time that Murry and another group of engineers from this engineering battalion were clearing trees in the false LZ. Tree top sappers were watching all these LZs closely and reporting back to Triet, who was nearby, coordinating attack plans, as circumstances unfolded. His sappers and NVA planners used como wire strung to various relay points to communicate faster. Registration rounds had already been fired, marking key strike locations at LZ X-Ray. These mortar teams were hidden deep within the triple canopy jungle surrounding the clearing. The arrival of the engineers on the morning of the 16th, at LZ X-Ray, did nothing, but reinforce the fact, that Triet needed to continue preparing this 500-meter-long clearing for an ambush. He was certainly not fooled by the creation of Murry's false LZ. It was just too small for landing a sizable unit in a timely fashion. However, the large LZ at X-RAY was a more likely landing spot and Triet knew that. He needed to be ready to greet the Americans if and when they arrived. There were more communication wires to be run and more tree-stand positions to be established for spotters and snipers. Ox cart trails leading into the clearing had to be clearly marked for sappers, who would be guiding largely clueless khaki uniformed conscripts to "close in" assembly points just off these trails. From there they would charge the Americans, at the sound of a whistle. If they assembled too far out, the first barrages of American artillery might wipe them out before they could make these suicidal advances. Also, if the Americans prepped the jungle around the clearing, before landing helicopters, that would also hamper Triet's plans. The bombing would disrupt recognizable landscape around troop assembly points and destroy como wired communication lines and booby traps. It could cause Triet to call off the ambush altogether. Nevertheless, the ambush preparations had to be started, whether the ambush was actually carried out or not. It made no difference. Cancelations of evolving tactical plans, like this, happened all the time. It was to be expected. The effort was good training and would not be wasted no matter whether he pulled it off or had to wait for a more opportune time. As he went about his duties, Triet thought to himself, "What more purposeful labor and death could these rice farmers be called upon to perform, than that which contributed to the goal of forging a utopian state?" "True believer Triet", himself had not slept in a real bed since 1961. He had been exposed to death many times as he rose in the ranks of the communist party. It was exciting. However, in the communist hierarchy, he was still far enough removed from personal contact with top leadership, like the pedophile Ho Chi Minh, and the murderous Mr. Duan, to have his idealism shattered by too close an association with these twisted minds. In a sick way, Triet's train of thought was spot on. It wasn't as if these deplorables would ever live in an environment, which would allow them to fiddle with a television in their garage, and maybe someday turning it into a communication device which would change the world for the better. Heck, they didn't even have garages, or televisions. When those technologies did finally show up, they would come from protected minds, which lived under the rule of righteous laws enforced by freedom loving societies and not tyrannical dictatorships, like those metastasized by the cancerous Marxist ideology. A Marxist is forced to steal their technology because murderous thoughts and creative thoughts do not mix well in the same brain. All these "deplorables" had left of any permanent value in their brief lives, as they huddled in hidden bunkers surrounding LZ X-Ray, was a small twinkling light coming from the love in their hearts, for family and ancestors. These ancestors, had never been anything but rice farmers, themselves and it was a sure bet, that Triet felt nothing but distain for them as well as their offspring, whom he now held in his grasp to do his bidding.          

      Dawn appeared at LZ Rufe, on the 17th day of June 1967, through a low hanging mist, penetrated by tiny droplets of drizzling rain. Soon after first light, Triet started receiving reports from his scouts, that something unusual was happening with the Americans he was shadowing. As he sat under a wet canopy, listening to more and more of these same reports, coming from his wired communications and now also from the lips of a "runner", it became obvious that today was going to be very different. He would have to continue to hide and keep watching to see just how different, but the events of this day were definitely not going to be like the day before. The messages were all saying the same thing. The Americans at LZ Rufe were filling in their bunkers and emptying sandbags. This was a clear indication that they were going to make a permanent withdrawal from LZ Rufe. What Triet needed to know now was how would they withdraw and where would they go? Would they withdraw by helicopter or by foot? Would they go home or move to another location? He knew withdrawals deep in the jungle were usually always made by helicopters, supported by a lot of covering artillery fires and gunships. This usually meant that while troops were loading, air strikes would also be blasting his potential troop assembly areas around the extraction point. If this was going to be the case, it wasn't a good scenario for Triet. Quite frankly, it would be better for him to keep hiding and watching for a better day. Shortly after 0700 hours, however, Triet received the news, which he had dared hope for, but thought would never happen. It was almost too good to be true news. American troops were assembling at the northern end of LZ Rufe and marching single file into the jungle. Triet's best trackers were soon on the job, verifying the direction and pace of these troops. It seemed as if they were indeed heading for the large clearing 1500 meters to the north (LZ-X-Ray). If that was true, Triet realized he now had the better part of three hours to position ambush assault units around the clearing. The silly clover-leafing maneuvers of the Americans actually gave Triet more time to stage an ambush.

      Without realizing it, Lazzell had now given Triet all the information he needed to set in motion an attack. He began to put his attack plans into high gear, being careful not to move his troops in, too close, too quick, before American air strikes and artillery had finished prepping the area. This is where the ox cart trails would come in handy. They were wide enough to move his troops quickly, after holding them back at a safer distance, until the Americans had finished shelling and bombing the jungle around the perimeter of LZ X-Ray. When the shelling stopped, double columns of his conscripts could be "double timed" down these wider trails, until they reached marked areas around the perimeter. The markings were in the form of shallow fox holes, which had already been dug several days before, not only to act as markers, letting the guides know where to halt and start dispersing the troops, but also to give these "brown uniformed conscripts" a little protection from rifle fire, coming from the Americans, as well as their own machine guns, firing from behind them. This was a tactical maneuver, which these troops had practiced doing over and over. Some carried RPGs and were taught to target American machine gun crews. Today, two of those American machine gunners would be Sergeant Murry's men, Jose Garcia and Bob Pointer. Enemy RPG teams would watch and wait for these machine gunners to start killing conscripts. When they opened up, it was easy to spot their location, because they were required to fire "here I am tracers" every fifth round. Once the masses of conscripts were spread out from the ox cart trails into these shallow fox-hole locations, life was reduced to two choices for them. When the whistles blew, signaling for an assault to be made, they could either rise up and make the suicidal assault or be shot dead by their own NCOs. At the same time that the whistles blew the alert NVA machine gunners would stop firing so they wouldn't shoot these conscripts in the back. Field telephone communications would also notify the mortar crews to stop firing. Simply put, Triet's dehumanized outfit was taught to perform like a well-oiled "Borg" machine, devoid of all human feelings for the wellbeing of the individual. It was only the collective will, which mattered.

      In comparison to Triet's command presence, it was as if Lazzell had just stepped off a plane at Tan Son Nhut Airport the day before, not as a "green jungle fighter" but as a civilian. After gleaning through report, after report, on the battle of Xom Bo II, I could hardly believe what I was reading. I have no personal bias toward anyone or anything here. I am just stating facts, from the perspective a soldier who was actually there on that battlefield, in hopes that some "up and coming" young leader, who takes the time to read this, will be able to glean a useful lesson from it. I couldn't find a single report of this battle, which reflected well upon Lazzell. Unlike Cavazos, or Haig, or Triet, for that matter, there was no indication that Lazzell had any ability, whatsoever, to anticipate what needed to be done next, nor did he ever learn to read clues which could indicate what the enemy was likely to do next. By this time, he had been in more engagements, than any other field officer would ever see, while serving in the First Infantry Division to date. Yet, he seemed transfixed and unable to understand his role, his men's roles, or how his enemy operated, to any greater extent, then he did on the first day he took command. As he faced his last battle before DEROS, it was not only, as if he had learned nothing in the past year, but it was blatantly obvious that he didn't think that he needed to learn anything. By this point, he had convinced himself that he had arrived, as the embodiment, of what a field commander should be. this is a typical end-point in the behavior pattern for "Little Men" if they are allowed to remain in a position of leadership. The solution is to remove them from that position as soon as they are diagnosed with the malady until they can be rehabilitated. 

      Here are some more reasons why I say what I have just said. First off, the lineup for the march from LZ Rufe to LZ X-Ray was all wrong on several counts. Murry's 1/16th Rangers A company led the march to the new location. Lazzell and headquarters followed. Captain Ulm's B company was next, while the very experienced First Lt. Doug Logan's recon platoon was sandwiched in behind their own Battalion and B Company of the Black Lions, who were bringing up the rear. This line-up immediately brings to mind a disturbing question. Why would Lazzell place his most capable troops, which was the recon unit, in the middle of the line of march? Instead, his recon should have been sent out, at first light, to scout the route ahead of the line of march. (Hench the name "recon".) Also, long before making the move, they should have already scouted and reported back to Lazzell, with a diagram of the area around LZ-X-Ray. That would have given Lazzell the "lay of the land", so to speak, so he could have already had his artillery people target critical locations with registration rounds long before the march began. A good time to have done that would have been on the day, that those brave engineers were busy in the clearing, blowing up trees and making room for supply helicopters to land. Here is another glaring error. B company of the 2/28th Black Lions marched out that morning at the rear of the Rangers, but their A Company was made to wait, until B company had arrived at the destination, three hours later, before they were allowed to moved out. How foolish was that? It was 1030 hours, before FO David Hearne and company left LZ Rufe. As a side note, their point man got them lost, along the way. First Lt. Hearne was a forward observer attached to this particular Black Lions A company and later wrote a book about the battle. David recorded various conversations with the men, who were there that day. There was no indication that it had occurred to Lt. Colonel Lazzell to do any of the preparations, which I just mentioned. I also found it disturbing that Hearne couldn't remember if there had been an early morning pre-march "face to face" meeting between Lazzell and his key people. David and his cohorts were definitely some of those key people. A "face to face" like this was very important, on many levels, before making any type of maneuver. Key subordinates needed to know, in a very personal way, exactly what their leader expected of them, and also how important their function was to the success of that particular undertaking. That message has much more power when communicated face to face. Cavazos understood this. Apple magnet, Steve Jobs, understood this, but Lazzell did not.

      As the forward element approached, the perimeter of LZ X-Ray, they stumbled across a huge warning sign. That warning sign was a well-worn trail discovered just 200 meters from the clearing at LZ X-Ray. Although Lazzell had two recon platoons, which he should have used to scout this area already, this was the first time that he was finding out about this trail. Its obvious, to me now, that this wasn't the first time that Lazzell failed to properly scout an area or ignore warning signs on the battle field. The significance of this find, however, was not lost on Donnie Gunby. Donnie was the country boy grunt in sergeant Murry's 2nd platoon, who found the trail. The trail had been heavily worn down very recently by a lot of heavy foot traffic. Donnie and anyone else with field experience knew this was important information. With his "mad face" on, however, because he was running behind schedule and was now having to pause again, Lazzell came stomping up to examine the trail for himself. He was visibly irritated about having to halt the column. The sour look on his face silenced everyone's input around him. The toxic attitude behind that sour look also prevented him from performing one of the most critical functions a battlefield commander will ever perform. That function is the ability to allow oneself the time and presence of mind to analyze new data. Why where there so many footprints on this trail? The angry Lazzell never asked that question. Instead, he focused on venting his anger because he was running behind schedule. Actually being behind schedule was his own fault. Hearne wrote about this incident this way. "The path's discovery caused 2nd platoon to temporarily halt their march so they could investigate their find. They were the lead element which meant the long column of men snaking behind them would be stopped and the men would be wondering what was going on. The column would become one big dangerous traffic jam. The path was reported to their platoon leader, Second Lt. Sermuskis. Once the Lieutenant saw how fresh and used the trail looked, he contacted Captain Williamson, who came strolling up to check out the find. Meanwhile Lieutenant Colonel Lazzell was fuming over the delay in the march. He was pissed-off that the march had halted and wanted to know why in the hell Alpha Company had stopped....Lazzell wasn't alarmed much by the trail but did call in an air strike to the east of LZ X-Ray. The fact that we were a bit behind schedule seemed to bother Lazzell more than the evidence of a large unit's presence."

      If the 1/16th commander had just stopped the fuming long enough to ask himself that "all important" question, "Why were all those fresh tracks there", then it would have been a first step in having the events of the rest of the day go so much better for our side. Donnie Gunby had already performed his job when he revealed the battlefield evidence to his superiors. He knew, with one glance, that the heavily traveled trail, was a clear indication of a large enemy force lurking nearby. Donnie's ability to do anything, beyond that, however, was nil. This battlefield evidence now needed to be properly addressed by the battalion commander. Unfortunately, it wasn't. At the battle of Ap Gu, Haig had done a splendid job of modeling critical thinking for Lazzell but it was as though Lazzell had napped out during that class. It wasn't and isn't a complicated process. Every great leader does it, many times over, from examining the smallest, to the largest clues. These footprints were made very recently and by a large number of soldiers. That was very evident. Furthermore, there was nothing in the clearing which could have possibly drawn them there other than possibly making a practice run for a later attack when there were people there. Instead of getting mad, Lazzell should have been asking himself, "How soon can my men prepare for an attack if it comes? However, Lazzell didn't do that. "Little men" are not good at critical thinking because under pressure to perform they are usually too busy getting mad at others about petty stuff.

      After his loses at the Battle of Ap Gu, Triet had been requiring his veterans to train new replacements on the tactical complexities of an attack on potential landing zones in our areas of operation. LZ X-Ray was just one of those potential landing zones. When engineers showed up the day before, to clear away some trees, his hopes were raised, that this particular clearing was soon to be used as a landing site. The well-worn trail indicated a quick "practice run". Triet's brand new replacement conscripts had been led, on this "practice run", by local VC and sapper teams. It was a "dry run" which prepared his troops to be ready for an assault, if and when that opportunity presented itself. This "practice run" would have also given Triet a very close estimate of the time needed to coordinate the various stages of a actual assault. At this very critical moment, while the 1/16th commander let himself be mindlessly agitated, the ox cart trail was screaming out the answer to a very important question. That question was, "Could there be an eminent possibility of an attack?". The answer was "yes" but Lazzell never ask the question, much less sought the answer.